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There is a democracy deficit at the intersection of crime, race, and 
poverty. The causes and consequences of hyperincarceration 
disproportionately affect those least likely to mount an effective 
oppositional politics: poor people and people of color. This Article 
breaks new ground by arguing that the democracy deficit calls for a 
democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law and procedure that 
modifies traditional justifications of retributivism and deterrence by 
prioritizing self-governance. Part I contextualizes the argument within 
cyclical retrenchments in movements for racial and economic justice. 
Part II sketches the contours of a democracy-enhancing theory. Parts III 
and IV turn that theoretical lens on a single jurisdiction, North Carolina, 
to map a previously unnoticed constellation of cutting-edge criminal 
justice reforms. Part III explains why those reforms were improbable. 
Part IV tests the democracy-enhancing effect of the reforms. Part V 
identifies some conditions that allowed reform to occur and occasionally 
survive counterattack. The Article concludes that those conditions 
privilege grasstops over grassroots advocacy, and highlights examples of 
direct action by low-income people and people of color as a vital 
component of a more broadly democratic foundation for criminal law 
and procedure.  
* © 2014 Janet Moore. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In late October 2010, Oklahoma Senator James Inhofe landed his private 
plane on a closed runway at a small airport in south Texas. He did not notice the 
“giant yellow X,” the repair trucks, or the fleeing workers “until it was too late to 
safely abort the landing.”1 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) sanctioned 
the senator by ordering him to take remedial flying lessons.2 He shot back with 
Senate Bill 1335, “The Pilot’s Bill of Rights.”3  
Inhofe sought to check the government’s “power to take action against an 
individual.”4 He explained that he never fully appreciated “the feeling of 
desperation” that adverse government action can inspire “until it happened to 
me.”5 He was troubled that “pilots sometimes aren’t given access to all the 
evidence that might help their case.”6 He was shocked that “it took me, a U.S. 
senator, four months to get the voice recording to prove I was right” in defending 
against the FAA’s accusations.7  
Sixty-four cosponsoring senators quickly backed Inhofe’s bill,8 as did 
organizations comprising more than half a million “single-issue people who fly 
airplanes.”9 Even Indiana Jones joined the fight. Lobbying on this “real justice 
issue,” actor Harrison Ford decried agency treatment of private pilots as the sole 
exception to “the standard that we face everywhere else for justice.”10 
The Pilot’s Bill of Rights cures that injustice by requiring the FAA to release 
“all relevant evidence” to a targeted pilot before proceeding with any enforcement 
action.11 The bill became law just thirteen months after Inhofe introduced 




3 S. 1335, 112th Cong. §§ 1–5 (2011) (enacted). For a detailed legislative history, see 
S. 1335 (112th): Pilot’s Bill of Rights, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s1335 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2014). 
4 Lowy, supra note 1. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Chris Casteel, Oklahoma Sen. Jim Inhofe Scores Legislative Victory With Pilots’ 
Rights Bill, OKLAHOMAN (July 2, 2012), http://newsok.com/controversial-landing-leads-to- 
inhofe-bill-on-pilot-rights/article/3689518 (subscription required). 
8 S. 1335 (112th): Pilot’s Bill of Rights, supra note 3. 
9 Lowy, supra note 1. 
10 Ford’s remarks are reported on Senator Inhofe’s website. Actor, Pilot Harrison 
Ford Endorses Inhofe’s Pilot Bill of Rights, JAMES M. INHOFE (Oct. 20, 2011), http://inhofe 
.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressRoom.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id= 
221db5bb-99b7-a687-ba91-52914db0c3c9. 
11 Id. The bill mandates that the FAA release data, including investigative reports, 
“that would facilitate the individual’s ability to productively participate in the 
investigation” of any alleged infraction that could affect his or her certification. Pilot’s Bill 
of Rights, S. 1335, 112th Cong. § 2(b)(4). The FAA must disclose such information to the 
targeted individual at least thirty days before ruling on the alleged infraction. Id. § 2(b)(5). 
To address Inhofe’s concern that appeals of FAA decisions to the National Transportation 
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it.12 Thus proceeded the campaign to open the black box—not the flight recorder 
that explains pilot error or equipment malfunction, but its cognate, the 
investigative file that can help a pilot defend against agency allegations of 
wrongdoing. 
John Thompson shares Inhofe’s interest in checking government power over 
the individual—and in ensuring accuracy and reliability in adjudications—by 
mandating enforceable governmental discovery duties.13 Thompson was not 
ordered to take remedial flying lessons. He was sentenced to death. For fourteen of 
the eighteen years that he was incarcerated, Thompson spent twenty-three hours a 
day in solitary confinement in a windowless six-by-nine-foot cell.14 A few weeks 
before his final execution date, a last-ditch investigation unearthed a microfiche 
copy of a laboratory report never previously disclosed by prosecutors or law 
enforcement.15 The exculpatory evidence in that report eventually led to 
Thompson’s release.16 
Despite their differences, the cases of Thompson and Inhofe share a salient 
theme. They raise concerns about the unfairness and inefficiency caused when 
government agents do not reveal information that is beneficial to the defense. In 
criminal cases like Thompson’s, such discovery obligations are imposed by Brady 
v. Maryland17 and related cases, criminal discovery rules, and codes of 
professional ethics.18 But two recent Supreme Court cases seriously undermined 
the already weak enforceability of those discovery duties.19 In Thompson’s case, 
five justices gave a wink and nod to Brady violations; the Court vacated 
Thompson’s $14,000,000 damages award despite prosecutors’ conceded violation 
of their due process discovery duties.20 The same majority told prosecutors who 
comply with Brady that they can be damned if they do; the First Amendment could 
not shield prosecutor Richard Ceballos from his supervisors’ retaliation when he 
brought Brady information to light.21 
No single-issue lobby, group of legislators, or movie star reacted to the 
experiences of Thompson or Ceballos by demanding nationally applicable, 
mandatory criminal discovery reform along the lines of Inhofe’s Bill of Rights for 
private pilots.22 And when a few U.S. senators recently sought criminal discovery 
Safety Board are simply “rubber stamps,” Lowy, supra note 1, the Pilot’s Bill of Rights 
expands appeal rights and reduces deference to FAA rulings. See S. 1335, § 2(d)–(e). 
12 See Pilot’s Bill of Rights, Pub. L. No. 112-153, 126 Stat. 1159 (2012) (to be 
codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 44101, 44701, 44703, 44710 (2012)); Casteel, supra note 7; 
S.1335—Pilot’s Bill of Rights, supra note 3. 
13 See Janet Moore, Democracy and Criminal Discovery Reform after Connick and 
Garcetti, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1329, 1330–31 (2012). 
14 Id. at 1348. 
15 Id. at 1348–49. 
16 Id. 
17 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
18 Moore, supra note 13, at 1329–30. 
19 Id. at 1353–54, 1365–66. 
20 Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1355–56 (2011). 
21 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006). 
22 Moore, supra note 13, at 1377 & n.345 (discussing the death, by the secret vote of a 
single senator, of federal whistle-blower legislation designed in part to protect prosecutors 
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reform, their proposal fell far short of the expansive provisions in the Pilot’s Bill of 
Rights.  
The Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 201223 responded to highly 
publicized Brady violations that occurred during the federal prosecution of former 
Alaska Senator Ted Stevens.24 Stevens’s colleague from Alaska, Senator Lisa 
Murkowski, proposed the Act. Where Inhofe had dozens of senatorial cosponsors 
for his reform bill, Murkowski had five.25 Where a half-million single-issue voters 
backed the Pilot’s Bill of Rights, a whopping 143 lawyers, law enforcement 
officers, and jurists gave their joint public imprimatur to the Fairness in Disclosure 
Act.26 Murkowski’s Act, while improving on Brady, also would have required far 
narrower disclosure than the Pilot’s Bill of Rights.27 Nevertheless, after a single 
hearing, the Act died in committee.28 
Murkowski’s Act also did not begin to approach existing state models for 
broad criminal discovery. For example, North Carolina pioneered the nation’s only 
mandatory, statewide, full open-file reform model.29 Those statutes mandate 
who strive to comply with discovery duties); see also John Thompson, Op-Ed., The 
Prosecution Rests, But I Can’t, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
04/10/opinion/10thompson.html?pagewanted=all (describing Connick and its aftermath).  
23 S. 2197, 112th Cong. § 2 (2012).  
24 In re Special Proceedings, 842 F. Supp. 2d 232, 241–42 (D.D.C. 2012). A 500-page 
investigative report found that Stevens’s prosecution was “permeated by the systematic 
concealment of significant exculpatory evidence.” Id. at 235. But the judge accepted the 
special investigator’s decision not to recommend contempt proceedings. Id. at 244. On the 
lack of sanctions for Brady violations, see, for example, Moore, supra note 13, at 1341–71. 
25 S. 2197—Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012, OPEN CONGRESS, http:// 
www.opencongress.org/bill/112-s2197/show (last visited Apr. 3, 2014). 
26 See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, A Call for Congress to Reform Federal Criminal 
Discovery (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/1 
0/callforcriminaldiscoveryreform.pdf. This “Call for Congress” issued the same day that 
Senator Murkowski introduced her bill, see S. 2197, supra note 25, which was also the 
same day the special prosecutors’ 500-page report was made available to the public. 842 F. 
Supp. 2d at 257. For the special prosecutor’s full report, see Report to Hon. Emmet G. 
Sullivan of Investigation Conducted Pursuant to the Court’s Order, Dated April 7, 2009, In 
re Special Proceedings, 842 F. Supp. 2d 232, 241–42 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 08-242 (RWR)), 
available at http://www.wc.com/assets/attachments/Schuelke%20Report.pdf. 
27 As discussed in Moore, supra note 13, at 1339–41, Brady’s materiality-prejudice 
test hamstrings the doctrine’s enforceability by requiring proof that disclosure of 
exculpatory or impeachment information would have created a reasonable possibility of a 
different outcome. The federal Fairness in Disclosure Act would have significantly 
strengthened discovery duties by defining them more broadly and by shifting the burden of 
proof, requiring prosecutors to prove that nondisclosure of information that “may 
reasonably appear to be favorable” to the defendant was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. S. 2197, 112th Cong. §§ 2(a)(1), (h) (2012). The Act also improves upon Brady by 
requiring disclosure “before the entry of any guilty plea.” Id. § 2(c)(1). See Moore, supra 
note 13, at 1343–46 (discussing doctrine limiting Brady disclosure duties to trial). 
28 S. 2197 (112th): Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012, GOVTRACK.US, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s2197 (last visited Apr. 3, 2014).  
29 Moore, supra note 13, at 1380–86 (discussing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-903 to -910 
(2012)). 
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disclosure to the defense of all information obtained in the state’s investigation of a 
criminal case.30 They require recordation of oral statements31 that are critical for 
impeaching prosecution witnesses,32 evaluating and negotiating plea offers, and 
counseling defendants on whether to testify.33 Willful violators of these discovery 
statutes face criminal penalties.34 
Several factors drive the wide variance in discovery duties that government 
actors owe an accused. A federal regulatory action against a private pilot raises 
very different concerns than those at issue in a criminal prosecution. The civil 
rights claims raised by Thompson and Ceballos under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 also raised 
distinctive stakes in the contest between federal deference to local authority on one 
hand and the vindication of federal constitutional rights on the other.35 
But the magnitude of the respective threats by the FAA and federal 
prosecutors to the interests of Inhofe and Stevens is minuscule compared with the 
very nearly successful attempt of New Orleans prosecutors to “fry” Thompson, a 
young, low-income African American man accused of murdering the wealthy 
white son of a prominent local businessman.36 The disparate responses to these 
cases might be dismissed as illustrating a political principle so basic as to be banal: 
Them as has, gets. Sharp systemic disparities enhance (for some) and hinder (for 
others) access to the political influence necessary to drive change. Inhofe occupies 
one end of the spectrum. His speed and strength in manipulating the levers of 
power appear steroid enhanced. 
Thompson’s case arose at the other end of the spectrum—amid the democracy 
deficit at an intersection of crime, race, and poverty.37 That intersection is 
30 Id. at 1332–33 (discussing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(1)(a) (2012)). 
31 Id. (discussing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(1)(c) (2012)). 
32 See R. Michael Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem 
of Impeachment Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1429, 1430–31 (2011). 
33 See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND 
TRIAL BY JURY 1–2 (3d ed. 1996). 
34 Moore, supra note 13, at 1332–33 (discussing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(d)).  
35 See, e.g., Gary S. Gildin, Redressing Deprivations of Rights Secured by State 
Constitutions Outside the Shadow of the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Remedies 
Jurisprudence, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 877, 889–97 (2011) (discussing Supreme Court 
justifications for limiting availability of civil rights remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
36 Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356, 1373 n.7, 1373–74 (2011) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting). As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in upholding Thompson’s 
multimillion-dollar jury verdict, such elevated victim status tends to “receive[] a lot of 
attention.” Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836, 843 (5th Cir. 2008), aff’d en banc, 578 
F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (equally divided decision), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1350 
(2011). Empirical research reveals that victim status, including racial or ethnic identity, is a 
significant contributor to outcome severity in criminal cases. Cassia Spohn, Thirty Years of 
Sentencing Reform: The Quest for a Racially Neutral Sentencing Process, 3 CRIM. JUST. 
427, 428 (2000). 
37 These terms are not reified. Of the abundant literature on the socially constructed 
meanings of “crime,” “race,” and “poverty” respectively, see, for example, MATTHEW D. 
ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 326–37 
(2012) (discussing relative definitions of poverty and building upon concepts of 
comparative fairness and well-being articulated in THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND 
PARTIALITY 64–68 (1991) and Larry S. Temkin, Equality, Priority, or What?, 19 ECON. & 
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structured by concentrated disadvantage.38 The multidimensional and recalcitrant 
resource disparities that, in some sense, serve as the foundation upon which 
criminal justice systems rest39 also raise hurdles to creating and maintaining 
coalitions across lines of race and class.40 Crime, hyperincarceration,41 and their 
causes and consequences are felt most directly and disproportionately by those 
least likely to mount effective oppositional politics and oversee the formation and 
implementation of criminal law and procedure—poor people and people of color.42 
PHIL. 61, 70–71 (2003)); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 3–8 (1993) (“[C]rime . . . is a slippery, variable, protean concept. . . .”); KAREN F. 
PARKER, UNEQUAL CRIME DECLINE: THEORIZING RACE, URBAN INEQUALITY, AND 
CRIMINAL VIOLENCE 6–7 (2008) (expressing “amaze[ment] to find that scholars disagreed 
entirely on the meaning of the term [race]”); Marjorie S. Zatz & Nancy Rodriguez, 
Conceptualizing Race and Ethnicity in Studies of Crime and Criminal Justice, in THE 
MANY COLORS OF CRIME 39, 39–40 (Ruth D. Peterson et al. eds., 2006) (noting that “race, 
ethnicity, gender, and class . . . do not have any inherent, absolute meaning” external to 
their social construction). 
38 See, e.g., Travis C. Pratt & Francis T. Cullen, Assessing Macro-Level Predictors 
and Theories of Crime: A Meta-Analysis, 32 CRIME & JUST. 373, 378–79 (2005) (“[T]he 
strongest and most stable macro-level predictors of crime include racial heterogeneity . . . 
poverty, and family disruption—factors typically treated as indicators of ‘concentrated 
disadvantage.’”); Robert J. Sampson & Lydia Bean, Cultural Mechanisms and Killing 
Fields: A Revised Theory of Community-Level Racial Inequality, in THE MANY COLORS OF 
CRIME, supra note 37, at 8, 11 (“It is unambiguously the case in meta-analysis[] . . . that 
concentrated neighborhood disadvantage is the largest and most consistent predictor of 
violence across studies.”). 
39 See, e.g., United States v. Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d 617, 628–45, 670–88 
(E.D.N.Y. 2011) (discussing factors affecting defendants’ lives, choices, and probabilities 
of successful reentry into society after imprisonment, such as segregated housing; 
inadequate schooling; unmet physical and mental health needs; and missing, dysfunctional, 
and violent family relationships). 
40 See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial Realism, in THE LEGAL STUDIES READER: A 
CONVERSATION & READINGS ABOUT THE LAW 250, 253 (George Wright & Maria Stalzer 
Wyant Cuzzo eds., 2004) (contending that “[b]lack people will never gain full equality in 
this country” due to adaptability of white dominance but that resistance “itself has meaning 
and should give us hope for the future”); Stephen M. Feldman, Do the Right Thing: 
Understanding the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 248, 250–52 (2012) 
(critiquing Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 
149 (2011), for failure to distinguish Bell’s interest-convergence and racial realism 
theories). 
41 Loïc Wacquant correctly rejects the term “mass incarceration.” It is precisely 
because unprecedented incarceration rates disproportionately affect low-income people and 
people of color while leaving the majority either unscathed or in some respect well served 
that those rates are less readily remedied through the democratic process. Loïc Wacquant, 
Class, Race & Hyperincarceration in Revanchist America, 139 DAEDALUS 74, 74, 78–79 
(2010).  
42 See, e.g., ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 1980–2008: ANNUAL RATES 
FOR 2009 AND 2010, at 3 (2011), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008 
.pdf (discussing disproportionate homicide victimization of minority individuals); ERIKA 
HARRELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BLACK VICTIMS OF 
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For some, the democracy deficit at the intersection of crime, race, and poverty 
supports skepticism if not despair toward litigation, legislation, and activism as 
avenues toward sustainable reform.43 But disparity need not breed despairity.44 
This Article argues that the democracy deficit calls for a democracy-enhancing 
theory of criminal law and procedure, which refocuses the traditional justifications 
of retributivism, deterrence, and rehabilitation by prioritizing self-governance.  
More specifically, this approach prioritizes direct participation by poor people 
and people of color, not only in the formation and oversight of what are too often 
perceived as criminal injustice systems, but also in reversing criminogenic policies 
that rely on those systems as mechanisms of social control. Thus, a democracy-
enhancing emphasis holds intrinsic value as well as promise for improving crime 
prevention, system legitimacy, and case outcomes.  
The argument unfolds in five parts. Part I contextualizes the despairity 
narrative in criminal law and procedure within a broader and cyclical retrenchment 
across movements for racial and economic justice. Part II explains the attraction of 
a democracy enhancement theory and sketches its contours. Parts III and IV train 
this roughly honed theoretical lens on North Carolina’s previously unmapped 
cluster of pioneering criminal justice reforms. 
Part III examines the regressive socioeconomic and political state history that 
made these reforms unlikely. Part IV describes the reforms and assesses their 
democracy-enhancing potential. While each helps to level power disparities, two 
pack significant punch. First, evidence-based early intervention programs, such as 
Nurse-Family Partnerships, build capacities for resilience and self-governance 
while costing pennies on the dollar vis-à-vis investment in criminal justice 
apparatuses. At the opposite, most resource-intensive end of the criminal justice 
spectrum, North Carolina’s Racial Justice Act vindicated the dignitary interests 
and participatory rights of diverse decision makers in capital juries by redressing 
racial bias in the exercise of peremptory strikes. 
Part V acknowledges that, just as motives for North Carolina’s constellation 
of criminal justice reforms have been mixed, so too their effectiveness and abilities 
VIOLENT CRIME 1–3, 5, tbl.5 (2007), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/bvvc 
.pdf (discussing disproportionate violent crime victimization of African Americans); Erica 
J. Hashimoto, Class Matters, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 31, 32–33 (2011) (noting 
overrepresentation of low-income people in criminal justice systems and calling for more 
data collection); Toya Z. Like & Jody Miller, Race, Inequality, and Gender Violence: A 
Contextual Examination, in THE MANY COLORS OF CRIME, supra note 37, at 157, 158 
(noting adolescent African American girls are at even higher risk of nonstranger violence 
than their male cohorts). For a brief introduction to the effects of conscious and 
unconscious racial biases in criminal justice systems, see Janet Moore, Causes, 
Consequences and Cures of Racial and Ethnic Disproportionality in Conviction and 
Incarceration Rates: An Introduction, 3 FREEDOM CENTER J. 35 (2011). 
43 See infra Part I.B. 
44 See infra Part I (defining “despairity” as “the tendency to despair of litigation and 
legislation as avenues to reform given demographic disparities in access to those levers of 
power”). See, e.g., NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES xv, 156–69 (2008) (noting but contesting 
the “general[] and depressing” scholarly agreement that globalization of the United States’ 
distinctively punitive “penal populism” is inevitable). 
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to survive reaction and repeal.45 This Part interrogates the conditions that allowed 
these reforms to occur and occasionally to survive counterattack. Distinguishing 
characteristics include institutionalized capacities for critical reflection and 
collaboration on hot-button criminal justice issues. Oppositional politics also play 
a role. They are informed by a relatively robust and proactive indigent defense 
function and diverse mechanisms for the collection, assessment, and strategic use 
of criminal justice data. 
The Article concludes that those conditions privilege advocacy by elites, and 
highlights examples of direct action by low-income people and people of color as a 
vital component of a more broadly democratic foundation for criminal law and 
procedure and, ultimately, of any sustainable turn away from criminogenic policies 
that feed the carceral state. 
 
I.  DESPAIRITY IN CONTEXT 
 
This Part identifies the despairity narrative in criminal law and procedure as a 
tendency to despair of litigation and legislation as avenues to reform given 
demographic disparities in access to those levers of power. This Part also 
contextualizes the despairity narrative within a broader and cyclical retrenchment 
across movements for racial and economic justice. Part I.A discusses sources of the 
democracy deficit at the intersection of crime, race, and poverty. Part I.B focuses 
on the despairity motif among criminal justice scholars. Part I.C situates that motif 
amidst an old and ongoing struggle to fulfill what historian John Hope Franklin 
described as this country’s broken “promise of real equality.”46 
 
A.  Human Beings and Citizens: Sources of the Democracy Deficit 
 
In October 2010, as Inhofe was landing his plane in south Texas; as attorneys 
were preparing to argue Thompson’s case before the Supreme Court; and as 
special prosecutors were investigating government suppression of exculpatory 
evidence in Stevens’s case, eleven men from a Brooklyn housing project were 
hammering out plea deals on federal drug and weapons charges. United States v. 
Bannister47 discusses the outcome in these cases. For several reasons, Bannister 
provides a distinctive window into the sources of the democracy deficit that 
contributed to the disparate long-term outcomes in the Inhofe, Thompson, and 
Stevens cases. 
First, Bannister’s opening lines transform a mine-run federal sentencing 
decision into a cri de coeur over lives impaled at the intersection of crime, race, 
and poverty. The judiciary is generally disinclined to detail the recalcitrant links 
between racial and class disparities in rates of undereducation, unemployment, 
45 Cf. EDWARD HALLETT CARR, WHAT IS HISTORY? 153 (1961) (“[N]o sane person 
ever believed in a kind of progress which advanced in an unbroken straight line without 
reverses and deviations and breaks in continuity so that even the sharpest reverse is not 
necessarily fatal to the belief.”). 
46 John Hope Franklin, Foreword, in DEMOCRACY BETRAYED xi–xii (David S. 
Cecelski & Timothy B. Tyson eds., 1998). 
47 786 F. Supp. 2d 617 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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poverty, substance abuse and addiction, family instability, and violence on one 
hand and criminal victimization, offending, incarceration, and recidivism on the 
other.48 Bannister comprises more than seventy pages of historical, legal, and 
socioeconomic analysis on those issues. That analysis was informed by the highly 
unusual personal visit of a presiding judge to the neighborhood in which the 
defendants lived and committed their crimes.49 
The opinion’s findings and conclusions are also noteworthy. The court found 
“substantial evidence” that mandatory minimum sentences for crack cocaine 
charges are the unconstitutional result of racial prejudice.50 The court further 
concluded that factors shaping defendants’ lives and opportunities rendered several 
of the mandatory minimum prison sentences excessive.51 Finally, the court 
acknowledged the improbability that scarce public funds would support the 
rehabilitation programs required by the sentencing order or that the defendants’ 
imprisonment would yield any positive outcome whatsoever. To the contrary, the 
court observed that the defendants were likely condemned upon completion of 
their sentences to lives in “a permanent underclass with almost no opportunity to 
achieve economic stability, let alone the American dream of upward mobility.”52  
The opinion’s final lines are circumspect. The court insists that while the 
defendants 
 
are hemmed in by circumstances, the law must believe that free will 
offers an escape. Otherwise, its vaunted belief in redemption and 
deterrence—both specific and general—is a euphemism for cruelty. 
These defendants are not merely criminals, but human beings and fellow 
American citizens, deserving of an opportunity for rehabilitation. Even 
now, they are capable of useful lives, lived lawfully.53 
 
Bannister’s parting words embody the court’s relentlessly grim inability to 
match the defendants’ capacities for “useful lives, lived lawfully” with even a 
remote likelihood that opportunities for rehabilitation will find any actualization. 
The court’s need to expressly affirm not only the defendants’ citizenship but also 
their humanity speaks volumes about their exclusion from approved structures of 
48 But see Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 140 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(noting that 70% of defendants represented by appointed counsel plead guilty; 70% of 
those plea-convicted defendants serve time in jail or prison; and nearly 70% of incarcerated 
inmates failed to graduate high school and are in the lowest two of five literacy levels—and 
therefore unable, for example, to “use a bus schedule”). Public defense cases also 
disproportionately involve defendants suffering from mental illness. See NAT’L RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING 
NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 75 (2009) [hereinafter JUSTICE 
DENIED], available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf. 
49 Tom Hays, Veteran Federal Judge Visits Drug Gang’s NYC Turf, USA TODAY 
(Mar. 5, 2011, 1:30 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2011-03-05-310 
3728283_x.htm. 
50 Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d at 666–67. 
51 Id. at 670, 674, 680–88. 
52 Id. at 689. 
53 Id. at 690. 
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self-governance, their deviance from a norm so elusive as to approach the 
chimerical.54  
 
B.  From Disparity to Despairity 
 
Bannister adds an important chapter to a massive literature on the racialized, 
politicized, and industrialized criminal justice policies in the United States; their 
contribution to unprecedented levels of incarceration; and the harsh effects on the 
low-income and minority individuals who disproportionately encounter criminal 
justice systems—often with multiple identities of victim, accused defendant, actual 
perpetrator, and witness.55 That literature has been decades in the making. More 
than a century ago, W.E.B. DuBois exposed the incommensurably low rates of 
education and employment and inversely high rates of criminal justice involvement 
for urban African American males.56 In the same era, Ida B. Wells barely escaped 
lynching during a career dedicated to identifying and challenging structural forms 
of repressive violence manifest not only in extralegal executions but also in convict 
leasing—two social control mechanisms that systematically resoldered well-forged 
links between crime, class, and color.57  
Of course, historical comparisons must be approached with caution.58 As 
Marie Gottschalk notes, “[T]he creation of the carceral state was more subtle and 
complex than just drawing a straight line from the plantation to Jim Crow to the 
ghetto to the prison-industrial complex today.”59 Whether the democracy deficit at 
the intransigent intersection of race, class, and crime is described in terms of the 
New Jim Crow60 or hyperincarceration,61 the upshot is the same. As illustrated 
54 See, e.g., LACEY, supra note 44, at 27–35, 116–18 (contrasting exclusionary and 
degrading criminal justice systems with inclusionary and rehabilitative systems). On the 
psychosocial need to define and exclude an “Other,” see, for example, JULIA KRISTEVA, 
POWERS OF HORROR: AN ESSAY ON ABJECTION 65–66 (Leon S. Roudiez trans., 1982) 
(noting various rites, the intentions of which are “to separate this or that social, sexual, or 
age group from another one”); Sampson & Bean, supra note 38, at 26–27 (discussing 
“symbolic violence” through which “people try[] to establish a worthy identity by drawing 
symbolic boundaries” between themselves and lower-caste Others). 
55 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.  
56 W.E. BURGHARDT DUBOIS, THE PHILADELPHIA NEGRO: A SOCIAL STUDY 83–99, 
235–58 (Benjamin Blom, Inc. 1967) (1899). 
57 See ANGELA D. SIMS, ETHICAL COMPLICATIONS OF LYNCHING: IDA B. WELLS’S 
INTERROGATION OF AMERICAN TERROR 45–61 (2010); IDA WELLS, CRUSADE FOR JUSTICE: 
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF IDA B. WELLS 61–63 (1970). 
58 See, e.g., CARR, supra note 45, at 34–35 (“[T]he historian is engaged on a 
continuous process of moulding his facts to his interpretation and his interpretation to his 
facts. It is impossible to assign primacy to one over the other.”). 
59 MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS 
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 263 (2006). 
60 See James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New 
Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 25–27 (2012); David Jacobs & Aubrey L. Jackson, On 
the Politics of Imprisonment: A Review of Systematic Findings, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 
129, 146 (2010) (concluding that law-and-order campaigns combined with an emphasis on 
the linkage between race and street crime provide a plausible explanation for the rapid 
increase in U.S. imprisonment rates); Victor R. Thompson & Lawrence D. Bobo, Thinking 
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below, the United States’ myriad local, state, and federal criminal justice systems 




These practices impose astounding costs in tax dollars and wasted lives. With 
a few important exceptions,63 the literature that documents these phenomena 
About Crime: Race and Lay Accounts of Lawbreaking Behavior, 634 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 16, 21–24 (2011) (discussing racial variance in individual-personal versus 
social-structural explanations for criminal offending). See generally MICHELLE 
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (comparing mass incarceration today to Jim Crow laws of the 
past); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME 
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007) 
(discussing the war on crime and its effects on legislative and judicial decisions, family and 
social interactions, public schools, and employment); AFTER THE WAR ON CRIME: RACE, 
DEMOCRACY, AND A NEW RECONSTRUCTION (Mary Louise Frampton et al. eds., 2008) 
(discussing the war on crime and its history, consequences, and potential solutions).  
61 See Wacquant, supra note 41, at 78–80.  
62 See, e.g., LACEY, supra note 44, at 140 fig.14; Roy Walmsley, World Prison 
Population List, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES 2–6 & tbls.1–5 (2013), http://www. 
prisonstudies.org/sites/prisonstudies.org/files/resources/downloads/wppl_10.pdf (providing 
data); CONNIE DE LA VEGA ET AL., CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: U.S. SENTENCING PRACTICES IN 
A GLOBAL CONTEXT 15–46 (2012), www.usfca.edu/law/docs/criminalsentencing (same). 
63 See Forman, supra note 60, at 45–64 (critiquing elision, in some New Jim Crow 
scholarship, of complex roles of socioeconomic class and violent intraracial crime); see 
also COOPER & SMITH, supra note 42, at 11–16 (providing tables and figures showing 
significantly disproportionate rates of black homicide perpetration and victimization 
despite overall decrease in homicide rates across racial categories); HARRELL, supra note 
42, at 1–3 (providing tables and figures showing declining but disproportionate rates of 
black violent crime victimization). 












*Excludes Adminstrative Detention 
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appears as empirically unassailable as the possibilities for criminal justice reform 
through democratic avenues of litigation, legislation, and activism appear dismal. 
As noted above, Bannister is unusual in its extensive judicial discussion of 
these issues. The opinion also is remarkable in being so thoroughly unremarked. 
Months after the decision issued, it had received virtually no citation or 
commentary from jurists,64 scholars,65 practitioners,66 or the press.67 This silence 
may be partly ad hominem. Some view the opinion’s author, Judge Jack B. 
Weinstein, as “a legal maverick” whose “liberal decisions have angered 
conservatives and run afoul of appellate courts.”68 
But Bannister’s silent treatment also may illustrate disparity begetting 
despairity. To be sure, disproportionate arrest, conviction, and sentencing rates 
along lines of race, ethnicity, and class are not confined to the United States.69 
Nevertheless, the intractability of this country’s distinctive inequalities at the 
intersection of crime, race, and poverty often lead to skepticism if not despair 
toward litigation, legislation, and activism as quintessentially democratic avenues 
toward sustainable reform in criminal law and procedure. In addition to the 
structural factors tallied up in Bannister, commentators and jurists have recognized 
the unprecedented concentration of power in the prosecution function,70 consistent 
64 Within the first twenty months of its issuance, courts cited Bannister twice, and 
only to distinguish it. See United States v. Taylor, No. 11 Cr. 310 (PGG), 2012 WL 
5991886, at *5 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012); United States v. Ilayayev, 800 F. Supp. 2d 
417, 421 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). 
65 But see Moore, supra note 13, at 1385 n.395. 
66 For example, as of February 2, 2013, the website of the National Association of 
Criminal Defense Attorneys contained no reference to the case. Search Results for 
“Bannister”, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, http://www.nacdl.org/ (use 
“Search” bar in upper-right-hand corner; then search for “Bannister”) (netting only one 
unrelated search result as of Apr. 3, 2014). 
67 A cursory Google search as of April 3, 2014 revealed minimal coverage of the 
decision by media outlets. But see Hays, supra note 49 (commenting on the presiding 
judge’s decision to visit a crime-ridden neighborhood to assist in sentencing). 
68 Hays, supra note 49. But see, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein Receives ALI’s John Minor 
Wisdom Award, AM. L. INST., http://www.ali.org/ali_old/R3102_04-Jackweinstein.htm 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2014) (describing recipient as “‘a legal polymath’—a creative jurist, a 
productive scholar, a pioneering civil rights advocate, and ‘one of the few judges whose 
achievements warrant mention in the same breath as the achievements of Judge 
Wisdom’”).  
69See LACEY, supra note 44 at 148–69 (discussing increased incarceration rates of 
foreign nationals in the United Kingdom and several European Union members); LOÏC 
WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL 
INSECURITY 277–78 (George Steinmetz et al. eds., 2009) (discussing incarceration rate for 
low-income, less-educated foreign nationals and first-generation descendants in France); 
Molly Townes O’Brien, Criminal Law’s Tribalism, 11 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 31, 31–32 
(2011) (discussing available data indicating a “global tendency of each population to 
imprison a disproportionate percentage of some minority groups”). 
70 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(describing “the vast power and the immense discretion that are placed in the hands of a 
prosecutor”); Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial 
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underfunding of indigent defense services,71 years of racially coded tough-on-
crime politics,72 and heightened federal judicial deference to local authority73 as 
circumstances limiting opportunities to improve the fairness, efficiency, and 
transparency of criminal justice systems. 
Professor Nicola Lacey has observed the rise of this country’s distinctively 
harsh “penal populism” from the other side of the Atlantic, noting “the general, 
and depressing, conclusion” that other nations “are constrained to tread the same 
path[.]”74 The law-and-economics analysis of the late Professor William Stuntz 
struck a similarly bleak tone. This leading scholar launched a jeremiad against the 
“pathological politics” infecting the formulation and implementation of criminal 
law and procedure.75 As he observed with characteristic acerbity, “[O]rganized 
interest group pressure to narrow criminal liability is rare.”76  
Given the improbability of a broad-based movement to reverse the 
disproportionate criminal victimization and incarceration of poor people and 
Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 960 (2009) (“No government official in America 
has as much unreviewable power and discretion as the prosecutor.”).  
71 See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 48, at 93–95; Robert P. Mosteller, Protecting the 
Innocent: Part of the Solution for Inadequate Funding for Defenders, Not a Panacea for 
Targeting Justice, 75 MO. L. REV. 931, 959–74 (2010) (critiquing Professor Darryl K. 
Brown’s proposals to ration service and absorb defense investigative function into law 
enforcement and prosecutorial, judicial, and forensic science functions). 
72 See sources cited supra note 60. 
73 See, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Essay, Rethinking the Federal 
Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 818–33 (2009) (citing low success 
of noncapital habeas petitioners to urge the elimination of habeas access for most prisoners 
and reallocation of resources from the back end to the front end of litigation). But see John 
H. Blume et al., In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffmann and King, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 435, 444–56 (2011) (contesting evidence and argument for Hoffman and 
King’s proposal); Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather than the 
Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 133–46 (2012) (same). 
74 LACEY, supra note 44, at xv. Lacey describes institutional variances between 
nations that temper the inevitability of globalized penal politics patterned after the United 
States. Id. at 156–69. But see Allegra M. McLeod, Exporting U.S. Criminal Justice, 29 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 83, 108–32 (2010) (detailing international expansion of U.S. 
criminal justice policies and procedures). 
75 See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001) [hereinafter Pathological Politics]; William J. Stuntz, The 
Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 794–98 (2006) 
[hereinafter Political Constitution]; William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
1969, 1973–74 (2008). 
76 Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 75, at 553 (emphasis omitted); see also 
Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND 
DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 110 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 
1996) (“[T]here is . . . no natural tendency for an emergence of secondary associations to 
correct for inequalities of political opportunity due to underlying economic 
inequalities . . . .”); Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on 
the Limits of Legal Change, in THE LEGAL STUDIES READER: A CONVERSATION & 
READINGS ABOUT THE LAW, supra note 40, at 199, 207–08, 218–20 (identifying structural 
barriers to have-nots achieving reform through litigation). 
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people of color, Stuntz offered a Gilded Age recipe for promoting more democratic 
decision making in criminal cases. He argued for more policing and prosecution of 
cases before more locally drawn venires that exercise broader discretion in 
applying fewer and more vaguely drawn criminal statutes.77 He saw these 
developments as “achievable,” but failed to explain how or why this was so, and 
conceded that his proposals for related reforms were unlikely to come to fruition.78 
Stuntz was not alone in presenting a truncated view of democracy’s 
possibilities in the context of criminal justice reform. Twenty years ago, Professor 
Donald Dripps used public choice theory to ask and answer the question, “Why 
Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?”79 More 
recently, Professors Marc Miller and Ronald Wright cited tough-on-crime politics 
as justifying the subordination of litigation and legislation in favor of internal 
bureaucratic reform as the most effective avenue for regulating prosecutorial 
decision making.80 And the New Jim Crow scholarship, while offering the most 
recent analysis of penal politics as a mechanism for caste construction and control, 
points to little empirical or theoretical ground from which to reclaim law and 
77 Stuntz, Unequal Justice, supra note 75, at 1974, 1982–97, 2031–39. These 
arguments are also presented in WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 30–31 (2011) (proposing local democracy as a possible explanation for 
low crime rates and a small prison population in turn-of-the-century Chicago). But see, e.g., 
IRVIN WALLER, LESS LAW, MORE ORDER xi–xvi (2006) (citing empirical research showing 
that investments in “police, courts, and corrections is not the way to prevent and reduce” 
crime). 
78 Stuntz, Unequal Justice, supra note 75, at 2031–39; cf. Stuntz, Pathological 
Politics, supra note 75, at 510–12, 600 (conceding improbability of proposal for judicial 
narrowing of overbroad and overly punitive criminal laws via federal constitution); Stuntz, 
Political Constitution, supra note 75, at 785, 846–50 (concluding that recommended 
reforms “probably won’t” occur and discussing legislatures’ enacting overbroad and overly 
punitive criminal laws in reaction to the courts’ constitutional regulation of criminal 
procedure). 
79 Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public 
Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1089–92 (1993); see also Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the 
“American Criminal Class”: Why Congress (Sometimes) Protects the Rights of 
Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 604–13 (2004) (surveying public process and public 
choice explanations for the fact that “[l]egislators have declined to protect criminal 
defendants, except in rare and narrowly circumscribed circumstances when powerful 
constituencies (the press, lawyers) have been threatened”). 
80 Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 128–30 
(2008). But see Marc L. Miller, A Map and a Compass for Judges: Sentencing Information 
Systems, Transparency, and the Next Generation of Reform, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1351, 
1353–54 (2005) (highlighting state legislative sentencing reforms); Ronald F. Wright, 
Counting the Cost of Sentencing in North Carolina, 1980–2000, 2002 CRIME & JUST. 39, 
41–43 [hereinafter Counting the Cost] (discussing sentencing reforms in the face of 
“politics of crime”); Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the 
Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 231–42 (2004) [hereinafter Parity] 
(describing successful state legislative efforts to balance prosecutorial and defense 
resources through parity assessment).  
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politics as viable avenues toward sustainable reform.81 That scholarship calls for a 
mass movement but fails to engage the historical difficulty of building and 
sustaining coalitions across lines of race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic class.82 
In light of the existing scholarship, the lack of commentary on Bannister may 
stem from a perception that the opinion carries coal to Newcastle. The dominant 
narrative contains good reasons for skepticism toward litigation, legislation, and 
activism as meaningful avenues for reducing the footprint of the carceral state 
while obtaining greater transparency, accountability, and fairness in the formation 
and implementation of criminal law and procedure. The hurdles to reform are 
daunting. Nor is the despairity narrative confined to theorists and practitioners who 
work on criminal justice issues. Similar retrenchment also is evident in broader 
movements for racial83 and economic justice.84 
 
C.  Despairity’s Broader Context 
 
Retrenchment within and across justice movements is a predictable response 
to postindustrial economic dislocation accompanied by increasingly unbridgeable 
gaps between haves and have-nots85—including, importantly, increasing 
geographic segregation by socioeconomic class.86 Intensifying concentration of 
81 See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 60, at 244–51 (suggesting that successful 
multiracial oppositional politics in this context may require surrendering affirmative-
action-based advocacy); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Criminal Republic: Democratic 
Breakdown as a Cause of Mass Incarceration, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L 133, 185–91 (2011) 
(promoting deliberative democracy’s promotion of empathy across difference). 
82 For example, released prisoner and longtime criminal justice reformer Susan 
Burton suggests that defendants “crash the system” by refusing plea offers and taking cases 
to trial but acknowledges that such collective action imposes significant risks to individual 
defendants. Michelle Alexander, Op-Ed., Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-cra 
sh-the-justice-system.html. 
83 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 40, at 245 (analogizing between Legal Realism and the 
state of racial inequality in the United States and arguing for Racial Realism as an approach 
to civil rights).  
84 See, e.g., GARY J. DORRIEN, RECONSTRUCTING THE COMMON GOOD: THEOLOGY 
AND THE SOCIAL ORDER vi–vii (1990) (arguing that although the “ravages . . . of poverty 
have not diminished with the triumph of liberal capitalism . . . [t]he language of socialism 
has become severely problematic . . . and not only because it was perverted long ago by 
totalitarians”). 
85 See, e.g., LACEY, supra note 44, at 21–22; Harry J. Holzer, Workforce Development 
as an Antipoverty Strategy: What Do We Know? What Should We Do?, 6, 7 (Inst. for the 
Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 3776, 2008) (tracking an 87% decline in federal 
workforce development funds from 1979, with “even greater” reduction in spending on 
disadvantaged populations, and observing that spending on federal employment and 
training in the United States is “just over 0.1% of GDP—a smaller fraction than is spent . . . 
virtually anywhere else in the industrial world”). 
86 See, e.g., Pedro Carneiro & James J. Heckman, Human Capital Policy, in 
INEQUALITY IN AMERICA: WHAT ROLE FOR HUMAN CAPITAL POLICIES? 77, 84–85 
(Benjamin M. Friedman ed., 2003) (“Declining real wages for low-skilled workers and 
increasing real returns to college graduation” combined with differential in high school 
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economic power in fewer hands87 conjoins degraded opportunities for social 
mobility88 and the flourishing of state capitalism as taxpayers rescue deregulated 
industries deemed “too big to fail”89 and too big to prosecute.90 The rightward 
ideological shift across branches of state and federal government, including the 
federal courts, prioritizes the market over the commons and the individual over the 
collective.91 Retreat from social welfare guarantees92 and the dead end of federal 
constitutional avenues toward poverty relief93 accompany the advance of an 
dropout and college attendance rates will make “the America of tomorrow even more 
unequal than the America of today and the America of the past.”); Lawrence F. Katz, 
Comment, in id. at 269, 276–77 (discussing growing geographic concentration of poverty 
in the United States); Sean F. Reardon & Kendra Bischoff, Income Inequality and Income 
Segregation, 116 AM. J. SOC. 1092, 1099–1100, 1106–07, 1125 (discussing increased 
residential segregation by income level, particularly between highest and lowest rungs of 
the economic ladder and with highest rates of change occurring among black families). 
87See Reardon & Bischoff, supra note 86, at 1094-96 (documenting the “U-shaped” 
U.S. income inequality trend, with 2006 rates returning to disparity levels of the 1920s, 
“exceptional rise” in upper-income increases, and the top decile receiving 45% of the 
national income). 
88 PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PURSUING THE AMERICAN DREAM: ECONOMIC 
MOBILITY ACROSS GENERATIONS 2–9 (2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/ww 
wpewtrustsorg/Reports/Economic_Mobility/Pursuing_American_Dream.pdf (discussing 
absolute income gains but relative and racially disparate “stickiness,” or limited mobility, 
with 43% stuck at the bottom of the economic ladder).  
89 See Benjamin A. Templin, The Government Shareholder: Regulating Public 
Ownership of Private Enterprise, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1127, 1128 (2010) (“By the end of 
the 2009 fiscal year, the U.S. government became one of the largest shareholders in the 
world owning a portfolio of investments valued at $ 959 billion.”); Mariana Pargendler, 
State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2917, 2925–26 (2012) 
(describing as anomalous the “partial nationalizations of distressed firms” in the United 
States after the 2008 financial crisis). For a different view of state capitalism and its 
historical roots in the United States, see generally William J. Novak, Law and the Social 
Control of American Capitalism, 60 EMORY L.J. 377 (2010). 
90 See, e.g., Dominic Rushe & Jill Treanor, HSBC’s Record $1.9Bn Fine Preferable to 
Prosecution, US Authorities Insist, GUARDIAN (Dec. 11, 2012, 3:37 PM), http://www.guard 
ian.co.uk/business/2012/dec/11/hsbc-fine-prosecution-money-laundering (discussing the 
U.S. Department of Justice’s declination to prosecute HSBC, one of the world’s largest 
banks, for, among other things, laundering money for terrorists and drug dealers). 
91 On alternatives to the hegemony of homo economicus, the classical liberal subject 
as autonomous self-interest maximizer, see Janet Moore, Covenant and Feminist 
Reconstructions of Subjectivity Within Theories of Justice, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
159, 163–70, 186–89 (1992). 
92 See, e.g., LACEY, supra note 44, at 85; Wendy A. Bach, Governance, 
Accountability, and the New Poverty Agenda, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 239, 243–50 (2010) 
[hereinafter Governance]; Wendy A. Bach, Welfare Reform, Privatization, and Power: 
Reconfiguring Administrative Law Structures from the Ground Up, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 
275, 278–82 (2009) [hereinafter Welfare Reform]. 
93 See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Disparate Treatment of Race 
and Class in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 122–26 
(2009) (probing causes of varying judicial scrutiny afforded to class-based and race-based 
claims for redress); Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of 
 
                                                     
560 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
ostensibly race-blind public ethos and jurisprudence.94 
These developments are not unique. They mark the latest oscillation in an 
ongoing contest over the appropriate location and limits of socioeconomic, 
political, and legal power in state capitalist democracies. In the United States, 
those tensions are radical. Founding federal documents championed equal liberty 
while simultaneously denigrating the First Nations as “merciless . . . Savages”95 
and consigning black slaves to proportional personhood,96 and while states limited 
suffrage within narrow confines of gender, race, and class.97 Historian John Hope 
Franklin located this fundamental polarity in a broken promise—“the promise of 
real equality, made by the Founding Fathers more than two centuries ago, a 
promise neither they nor their successors kept.”98 
This tension between liberatory promise and reneging is “so fundamental—
and so morally embarrassing—that we have gone to [great] lengths to obscure 
it.”99 But cycles of reform and reaction are traceable in thirty- to fifty-year 
segments. At the birth of the new republic, even within the confines of propertied 
white male privilege, the transition from the post-Revolutionary Articles of 
Confederation to the Constitution was hotly contested by Antifederalists opposed 
to a dangerous new concentration of political authority.100 There was particular 
concern that the new structure was designed to benefit commercial elites at the 
expense of the yeoman farmer and a broader common good.101 Passions lingered 
Poverty Law, Dual Rules of Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 630–31 
(2008) (discussing the Supreme Court’s effective elimination of legal redress for poverty-
based claims). 
94 See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2625, 2631 (2013) (holding that 
the Voting Rights Act was an unconstitutional violation of states’ rights because “things 
have changed dramatically [since the enactment of the Voting Rights Act]. . . . ‘[V]oter 
turnout and registration rates now approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of 
federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.’” 
(quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009))); Reva 
B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in 
Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1332–38 (2011) (critically examining the race-
neutral arguments underlying the decisions in Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) and 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 
(2007)). 
95 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 24 (U.S. 1776). 
96 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
97 See, e.g., ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY 
OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 43 (2009) (discussing race- and gender-based 
limitations on voting during founding period); id. at 16 (discussing class-based limitations); 
see also id. at xx (discussing all three limitations).  
98 Franklin, supra note 46, at xii.  
99 William H. Chafe, Epilogue from Greensboro, North Carolina: Race and the 
Possibilities of American Democracy, in DEMOCRACY BETRAYED, supra note 46, at 277, 
278. 
100 See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, Antifederalism and the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 987, 989 (1988).  
101 See, e.g., Centinel, Letter I, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST: WRITINGS BY THE 
OPPONENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION 16 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1985) (“[T]he proposed 
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after the Constitution’s ratification and ignited uprisings such as the Whiskey 
Rebellion.102  
In the 1830s, transcendentalist precursors of the Social Gospel movement 
decried the structural subjugation and exploitation of women and slaves as well as 
the “wage slavery” to which business interests subjected the working poor.103 Post-
Reconstruction African Americans and poor whites joined forces in Fusionist and 
other progressive movements to expand social, economic, and political 
opportunities.104 In subsequent decades, labor and civil rights leaders found 
common ground to combat hierarchies fed by twinned theories of socioeconomic 
Darwinism and an oxymoronic “scientific racism.” 
Each oppositional movement met with co-optation, reaction, and, in some 
instances, outright revolution and repeal. From the Whiskey Rebellion to the Alien 
and Sedition Acts; from the ethnic and sectarian riots of the 1820s and ’30s 
through the horrifying violence of the Civil War and the white supremacy 
movement’s murderous overthrow of Fusionist governments at the turn of the 
century; from the pitched battles between capital and labor in the 1920s and ’30s to 
the most recent civil rights era and its aftermath, efforts to actualize the liberatory 
potential inherent in aspects of this nation’s founding have collided with the 
determination of elites to obtain, retain, or regain privilege.  
As the oscillation between these opposing interests continues, some see bright 
spots on the horizon. In light of trends favoring globalization, deregulation, tax 
reduction, and diminution of government, new governance scholars discount the 
adversarial pursuit and vindication of rights through litigation and legislation in 
favor of local collaboration and internal agency self-reform.105 Others see 
opportunities in the retreat from social welfare commitments to incorporate, 
through state constitutions and statutes, international human rights models for 
securing socioeconomic prerequisites to meaningful participation in democratic 
plan . . . is a most daring attempt to establish a despotic aristocracy among freemen, that 
the world has ever witnessed.”)  
102 See, e.g., David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and Second Amendment 
Revolution: Conjuring with the People, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 879, 904–08 (1996). 
103 See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF AMERICA, 1815–1848, at 643–56 (2007) (discussing confluence and divergence of 
interests between abolitionists, transcendentalists, and early feminists); 2 THEODORE 
PARKER, Of Justice and Conscience, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF THEODORE PARKER, 
SERMONS—PRAYERS 37, 48 (Francis Power Cobbe ed., 1879) (“I do not pretend to 
understand the moral universe; the arc is a long one, my eye reaches but little ways . . . 
from what I see I am sure it bends towards justice.”). 
104 See 1898 WILMINGTON RACE RIOT COMM’N, 1898 WILMINGTON RACE RIOT 
REPORT 35–46 (2006) [hereinafter WILMINGTON REPORT], available at http://www.history. 
ncdcr.gov/1898-wrrc/report/report.htm; David S. Cecelski & Timothy B. Tyson, Preface, 
in DEMOCRACY BETRAYED, supra note 46, at xii, xiv; Michael Honey, Class, Race, and 
Power in the New South: Racial Violence and the Delusions of White Supremacy, in 
DEMOCRACY BETRAYED, supra note 46, at 163, 174; infra Part III.B.  
105 See, e.g., Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace 
Equity in Higher Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247, 248–51 (2006).  
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self-governance.106 From an increasingly dominant “race-blind” civil rights 
jurisprudence, Professor Reva Siegel wrestles a core commitment to the 
vindication of individual human dignity and community harmony (or at least to the 
minimization of intergroup resentment).107  
Some commentators on criminal law and procedure also accentuate the 
positive. A “liberty affirming” theme is detected in post-Warren era rulings that 
heralded the Supreme Court’s resurgent conservatism.108 Professors Marc Miller 
and Ronald Wright identify unexpected pockets of legislative support for criminal 
justice-system improvements.109 David Cole views converging interest in cost 
cutting during tight fiscal times as a sign that the nation is “turning the corner on 
mass incarceration.”110 And Inhofe and Murkowski might be surprised by the 
scope and history of North Carolina’s pioneering full open-file criminal discovery 
reform.111 
But there may be some whistling past the graveyard in all of the foregoing 
scholarship. Some scholars challenge new governance theories as masking old 
patterns of deference to market-driven paradigms, and as failing to account for the 
barriers to expanding deliberative democracy beyond the usual cadre of elites.112 
Theologian Gary Dorrien questions the possibility of meaningful poverty reduction 
in a polity that often brands analysis of income disparity as class warfare and views 
discussion of income guarantees or other significant resource redistribution as 
socialist anathema.113 And it is reasonable to worry that antibalkanization analysis 
embodies an uncomfortably familiar solicitude for the feelings of wounded white 
privilege.114 
106 See, e.g., Alana Klein, Judging as Nudging: New Governance Approaches for the 
Enforcement of Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
351, 391–404 (2008). 
107 See Siegel, supra note 94, at 1298–1303, 1352. 
108 Louis D. Bilionis, Conservative Reformation, Popularization, and the Lessons of 
Reading Criminal Justice as Constitutional Law, 52 UCLA L. REV. 979, 1047 (2005). 
109 See Miller, supra note 80, at 1359–63; Wright, Counting the Cost, supra note 80, 
at 58–77; Wright, Parity, supra note 80, at 263–68. 
110 See David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 27, 31 (2011). 
111 See Moore, supra note 13, at 1371–77 (detailing the legislative history of open-file 
criminal discovery reform). 
112 See, e.g., Susan Carle, Progressive Lawyering in Politically Depressing Times: 
Can New Models for Institutional Self-Reform Achieve More Effective Structural Change?, 
30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 323, 343–49 (2007); Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance 
Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 338–63 (2009). 
113 GARY DORRIEN, ECONOMY, DIFFERENCE, EMPIRE: SOCIAL ETHICS FOR SOCIAL 
JUSTICE 139–50, 187–93 (2010); see also MICHELE LANDIS DAUBER, THE SYMPATHETIC 
STATE: DISASTER RELIEF AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 14–15, 33–
34, 152–54 (2013) (tracing U.S. history of justifying resource redistribution by casting 
recipients as innocent disaster victims). 
114 See DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 1 (2008) 
(discussing civil rights jurisprudence that measures relief “less by the character of harm 
suffered by blacks than the degree of disadvantage the relief sought will impose on 
whites”); cf. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY xvii (1932) 
(“[W]ill a disinherited group, such as the Negroes for instance, ever win full justice in 
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In criminal justice scholarship, the despairity narrative can cast rosier views in 
a similarly cold light. The Supreme Court’s purported “liberty affirming” turn can 
readily be reframed as a sympathetic (and selective) response to tough-on-crime 
politics.115 Convergent interests around cost cutting have historically proven to be 
evanescent motivators of criminal justice reform.116 And it will take more focused 
empirical research to discern the feet-on-the-street effectiveness of initiatives such 
as funding parity for prosecutors and public defenders117 or statewide, full open-
file discovery.118 
This Article responds to these deeply rooted tensions and recurring 
oscillations by arguing for the development of a democracy-enhancing theory of 
criminal law and procedure as a more stable ground—at least complementary if not 
philosophically and strategically superior to budget-driven interest convergence—
for sustainable reform at the intransigent intersection of crime, race, and poverty 
that Bannister maps so vividly. Part II explains the attraction of a democracy-
enhancement theory and sketches its contours. While roughly honed, this 
theoretical lens is adequate for the analytical and normative work undertaken in 
Parts III through V.  
 
II.  DEMOCRACY ENHANCEMENT IN CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 
 
This Part sketches the contours of a democracy-enhancing theory of criminal 
law and procedure. Part II.A defines “democracy” as it is used in the ensuing 
argument. Part II.B anticipates and responds to some objections against the 
democracy-enhancement frame. Part II.C clarifies distinctions between democracy 
enhancement and the two major theoretical justifications for criminal conviction 
and punishment: retributivism, which emphasizes individual moral culpability, and 
utilitarianism, which emphasizes deterrence. Part II.D identifies some resources for 
the future task of fully articulating a democracy-enhancement theory. 
 
A.  Defining Democracy 
 
Professor Nicola Lacey frames democracy as a set of core values embodying 
“the will of citizens” enacted through their “participation . . . in decision-making” 
along with “accountability of officials for proper conduct and effective delivery of 
policies in the public interest[,] adherence to the rule of law and respect for human 
rights.”119 Working within that framework, this Article defines democracy 
society [through accommodation]? Will not even its most minimum demands seem 
exorbitant to the dominant whites, among whom only a very small minority will regard the 
inter-racial problem from the perspective of objective justice?”). 
115 Joseph E. Kennedy, Cautious Liberalism, 94 GEO. L.J. 1537, 1548–53 (2004). 
116 See, e.g., MARK COLVIN, PENITENTIARIES, REFORMATORIES, AND CHAIN GANGS: 
SOCIAL THEORY AND THE HISTORY OF PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 69–71, 106–07 (1997) 
(describing role of budget crises in penology’s historical “cycles of reform, stagnation, and 
repression”). 
117 See Wright, Parity, supra note 80, at 253–62. 
118 Moore, supra note 13, at 1371–77. 
119 LACEY, supra note 44, at 9. 
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enhancement as the promotion of individual and communal self-governance. 
Minimally, self-governance means exercising rational and emotional intelligence 
to check concentrated power. Maximally, democracy enhancement promotes the 
exercise of moral imagination through equal participation by individuals-in- 
community in the pursuit of equal dignity and human flourishing.120  
The metaethical stance is pragmatic and eclectic. The theory aims to bridge 
oppositions between retributivism’s deontological rules, which emphasize the 
autonomous individual’s generation of and submission to the morally just precept, 
and utilitarianism’s teleological goals, which emphasize maximal well-being. 
Kantian respect for the equal dignity of persons unites with critical theory’s 
recognition that communicative action necessarily entails intersubjectivity. 
Appreciation for classical virtues—courage, temperance, prudence, and justice—is 
tempered by Niebuhrian suspicion of hubris, perfectionism, and end-of-history 
narratives.121  
The subject of self-governance, the individual-in-community, is more than a 
consumer or producer of goods.122 Self-governance is an activity occurring 
simultaneously and in multiple spheres. At the level of individual impulse, self-
governance involves interaction between the amygdala and the frontal lobe. Self-
governance also unfolds in contests and collaboration between and among 
individuals, groups, institutions and other collective interests. 
Thus, democracy as self-governance is simultaneously an ongoing set of 
activities and an ideal never fully achieved.123 In the criminal justice context, 
democracy occurs more or less—mostly less at the intersection of crime, race, and 
poverty—as actors exercise and shape discretion in varied settings, often with 
multiple, overlapping, and shifting roles.  
Criminal justice stories involve perpetrators and victims, accusers and 
accused. But as the Bannister decision indicates, those actors and identities are just 
the tip of the iceberg. Relevant acts and omissions also flow from parents, 
extended families, schools, neighborhood organizations, and churches; businesses, 
foundations, and public service providers; the popular press and other media; 
legislative and executive branch representatives (including mayors, governors, and 
appointed panels or commissions) and their constituencies; law enforcement, 
prosecutors, defense counsel, juries, and judges; corrections personnel, and 
probation, parole, or other reentry workers. 
120 Moore, supra note 91, at 159, 163–70, 186–89.  
121 See, e.g., REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE IRONY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 138 (1952) (“A 
too confident sense of justice always leads to injustice.”); cf. CORNEL WEST, PROPHESY 
DELIVERANCE! AN AFRO-AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY CHRISTIANITY 17 (1982) (“This 
emphasis on process, development discontinuity, and even disruption precludes the 
possibility of human perfection and human utopias.”). 
122 Moore, supra note 91, at 167–70.  
123 Cf. Sheldon S. Wolin, Fugitive Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE 31, 
43 (1996) (“Democracy needs to be reconceived as something other than a form of 
government: as a mode of being that is conditioned by bitter experience, doomed to 
succeed only temporarily, but is a recurrent possibility as long as the memory of the 
political survives.”). 
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To enhance democracy in the formation, implementation, and oversight of 
criminal law and procedure, particularly at the tail end of these relational networks, 
is to prioritize participation by the low-income and minority individuals who are 
most directly and disproportionately affected by crime and criminal justice 
systems, particularly at the front end. Such an approach has the potential not only 
to improve crime prevention and case outcomes, but also to shore up the often 
fragile legitimacy of what many perceive, with some justification, to be criminal 
injustice systems.  
To that end, a democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law and procedure 
persistently asks whether and how particular developments promote self-
governance, the reduction of the carceral footprint, and the shaping and oversight 
of criminal justice policies and institutions by the low-income and minority 
individuals and communities disproportionately affected by crime, its causes, and 
its consequences. This approach incorporates aspects of traditional justifications 
for criminal law while demanding more. Democracy enhancement takes moral 
desert more seriously than retributivism, aims for more effective deterrence than 
utilitarianism, sharpens the focus of rehabilitative theory, and may provide more 
stable ground for the healing relationships that constitute restorative justice. 
 
B.  Why Democracy? 
 
The call for a democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law and procedure 
raises important questions. Their comprehensive identification and discussion is 
beyond the preliminary sketch offered here, but several warrant immediate 
attention. Is democracy enhancement too narrow a lens through which to reimagine 
and refocus criminal law and procedure? Does this focus foreground procedure at 
the expense of substantive justice? Conversely, is democracy enhancement too 
protean a concept to be useful? Does this approach improperly discount interest 
convergence and cost-benefit analysis as effective reform tactics?  
 
1.  Is Democracy Too Small? 
 
Professor Allegra McLeod helpfully raises the first questions about the limits 
of a democracy-enhancing focus, noting that attempts to improve existing criminal 
justice systems are often merely ameliorative and can even make things worse.124 
McLeod rightly insists that reformers must keep their eyes unswervingly on the 
decarceration prize.125 To that end, she argues for an imaginative stance that 
identifies and pursues “unfinished alternatives” to the carceral state.126 
124 Allegra McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting 
Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1615–30 (2012) [hereinafter Decarceration Courts] 
(discussing flaws in alternative court models).  
125 Id. at 1632; see also Allegra McLeod, Confronting Criminal Law’s Violence: The 
Possibilities of Unfinished Alternatives, 8 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 109, 129–30 
(2013) [hereinafter Confronting Violence] (arguing for regrounding of social controls 
outside of criminal justice apparatuses). 
126 McLeod, Confronting Violence, supra note 125, at 132. 
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The carceral norm is a national addiction. Reformers too readily serve as 
enablers. But McLeod’s decarceration proposals require more than expanded 
“imaginative horizons.”127 They require revised patterns of resource allocation.128 
Those revisions in turn require a robust and sustainable oppositional politics. 
A democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law and procedure aims 
simultaneously to reimagine the justification and purpose of criminal justice 
systems while reducing the footprint of the carceral state. The theory does so by 
prioritizing the empowerment of low-income and minority individuals and 
communities to participate more fully in the formation and implementation of 
criminal justice policies. 
That participation is not merely procedural, nor is it an end in itself. The 
animating principle and goal of a democracy-enhancing theory is the actualization 
of equal human dignity. Essential prerequisites include reducing criminal 
offending and victimization as well as the predictable causes and consequences of 
crime discussed in Bannister. Thus, a democracy-enhancing theory bridges 
dichotomies pitting procedural versus substantive justice, utilitarian goals versus 
deontological rules, and the exercise of free will by autonomous individuals versus 
the collective generation and enforcement of norms and identities. 
 
2.  Is Democracy Too Large? 
 
A democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law and procedure acknowledges 
cost-benefit analysis and interest convergence as useful reform tactics. But there 
are good reasons to maintain an arm’s-length partnership with homo 
economicus,129 some of which are empirical. 
As noted above, budget cutting grows more or less salient as state capitalism 
spins through repetitive boom-and-bust cycles. Moreover, as discussed in Part 
IV.B.1, “smart on crime” and “justice reinvestment” initiatives tend to morph away 
from evidence-based prevention via human capital development and toward 
extension of surveillance and control structures. Those policy choices are 
predictable despite their criminogenesis130 and the fact that evidence-based 
prevention costs pennies on the increasingly scarce tax dollar.131 Indeed, as 
Professor James Forman notes, black-majority jurisdictions, such as Washington, 
D.C., also exhibit tough-on-crime hyperincarceration patterns.132 
Such decision making belies rational choice theory in part because the theory 
rests on a flawed account of human subjectivity. On that account, the subject is 
127 Id. at 113. 
128 Id. at 113, 116, 118, 130. 
129 See supra note 91. I thank Mike Cassidy for inspiring the analysis in this subpart. 
130 See, e.g., L.M. Vieraitis et al., The Criminogenic Effects of Imprisonment: 
Evidence from State Panel Data, 1974–2002, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 589, 606, 
614–16 (2007) (documenting and discussing criminogenic effect of imprisonment).  
131 See infra Part IV.C.1. 
132 James Forman, Jr., The Roots of Prosecutorial Discretion: How Mandatory 
Minimums Came to Washington, D.C.’s Local Courts, Notes for Panel Presentation at 
Mid-Year Meeting of Ass’n of Am. Law Schools, San Diego, California (June 11, 2013) 
(on file with Author). 
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first and foremost a consumer of goods—a radically individuated, calculating self-
interest maximizer. Yet according to Professor Daniel Kahneman, winner of a 
Nobel Prize in economics, “it is self-evident that people are neither fully rational 
nor completely selfish, and that their tastes are anything but stable.”133 Emotion 
regularly trumps critical analysis.134 Fear and anger over crime and perceptions of 
crime override data-driven policy making. 
Moreover, to the extent that self-interested rationality is at work, cycles of 
criminogenesis, victimization, arrest, prosecution, incarceration, and recidivism 
feed too many families. Interests converging around cost cutting inevitably collide 
with countervailing, converging interests of myriad stakeholders. Among the more 
obvious are law enforcement officers and forensic analysts; prosecutors and victim 
advocates; judges and court personnel; probation and parole officers; and defense 
attorneys, investigators, and paralegals. Layers of administrators keep the 
machinery running. Jails and prisons employ thousands, with prisons increasingly 
run for profit and sited in low-income rural areas. Universities and nonprofit 
organizations receive millions of dollars annually in tax and foundation dollars to 
evaluate, critique, advise, and attempt to reform these stakeholders and the systems 
in which they are mutually embedded.  
Cost-benefit analysis and interest convergence are useful tactics for treating 
symptoms but cannot cure such metastasis.  
 
3.  Is Democracy Just Right? 
 
There are more than empirical reasons for circumspection toward privileging 
cost-benefit analysis and interest convergence in the struggle for sustainable 
criminal justice reform. Democracy enhancement draws upon a richer and deeper 
normative commitment—often overshadowed, if not actively repressed, by 
dominant utilitarian analyses—to the equal dignity of persons.135  
As discussed in Part I.C, it is ultimately the deep normative pull of that 
commitment—the commitment to fulfill what Franklin called the broken promise 
of “real equality”136—that explains small and large expansions of human rights and 
corresponding obligations in the struggle against equally radical commitments to 
the development and maintenance of hierarchy.137 The democracy deficit at the 
intersection of crime, race, and poverty throws the unsatisfactory nature of that 
progress into sharp relief.  
Professor Steven L. Winter’s archeology of democratic theory is helpful in 
unpacking these points. Winter highlights the critical role of interpersonal respect 
133 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 269 (2011). 
134 See, e.g., id. at 252–53 (discussing optimistic bias); id. at 380–85 (discussing the 
peak-end rule and duration neglect). 
135 See Moore, supra note 91. 
136 Franklin, supra note 46, at xii. 
137 Cf. JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND 
PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870–1920, at 373 (1986) (noting 
that only deeply norm-driven reforms can “be more than cosmetic”).  
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in the classical conception of isonomia.138 He contrasts democracy’s philosophical 
and etymological roots, which are grounded in the power (kratos) of the masses 
(demos), with those of isonomia, which references equal participation in the 
generation and administration of law.139  
Winter’s discussion of isonomia points to an underlying historical shift from 
thesmos to nomos—from the external to the internal generation of perceived 
obligation.140 Legitimacy means lawfulness. That meaning derives from mutuality.  
Winter emphasizes that the collaborative activity of self-governance requires 
“fortitude and initiative—the virtue” of habitually and actively controlling public 
institutions.141 As the Bannister opinion indicates, unique hurdles impede the 
development and exercise of these capacities at the intersection of crime, race, and 
poverty. 
A democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law and procedure aims to knock 
down those hurdles. In terms of deep norms and theory, this approach claims 
isomoiria, the joinder of political and economic equality,142 as a precondition of 
isonomia, mutual and legitimate self-governance. Expressly claiming Franklin’s 
“real equality” as a deep norm allows a democracy-enhancing theory to 
incorporate and improve upon the traditional criminal law justifications of 
retributivism and deterrence. 
 
C.  Democracy Enhancement and Criminal Theory 
 
Retributivism insists that “free will offers an escape”143 from circumstances, 
such as resource disparities, that provide contexts for and shape decision making. 
On this theory, it is the ineluctably moral decision of an autonomous individual to 
do an illegal act that warrants condemnation and punishment. Retributivism’s 
focus on individual moral desert allows for consideration of resource disparities 
(whether capital, human, or social) at various pivot points in the system. Existing 
data collection and assessment limit analysis of the degree to which those factors 
affect declination by crime victims, law enforcement officers, and prosecutors, 
respectively, to accuse, arrest, or charge. Consideration of these factors is most 
regularized in the application of rules that mitigate charge level and sentence.144 A 
blunter instrument is the Supreme Court’s recent use of developmental 
neurobiology to draw bright-line sentencing limits under the Eighth 
Amendment.145 
138 Steven L. Winter, Down Freedom’s Main Line, 41 NETHERLANDS J. LEGAL PHIL. 
202, 237 (2012). 
139 Id. at 237–38. 
140 Id. at 237 n.118. 
141 Id. at 240. 
142 Id. at 238 n.123. 
143 United States v. Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d 617, 690 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). 
144 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 42, at 38 (discussing Vera’s work); Miller & Wright, 
supra note 80, at 155–59; Spohn, supra note 36, at 473–78, 481. 
145 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) (holding mandatory life 
imprisonment unconstitutional for juveniles); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
559–60 (2004) (barring juvenile executions); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–16 
(2002) (barring execution of defendants with mental retardation). 
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But retributivism is itself profoundly immoral to the extent that it fails to 
account for and remediate structural disparities that, on one hand, significantly 
enhance the rewards of criminal offending,146 and, on the other, inhibit 
participation in policy formation and implementation—that is, the definition of 
crime and the oversight of its enforcement—by the low-income people and people 
of color who have disproportionate contact with crime and criminal justice 
systems. A democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law and procedure should 
focus like a laser on the concentrated disadvantage that characterizes the 
intersection of crime, race, and poverty to promote the development and exercise 
of personal and communal self-governance. 
A democracy-enhancement emphasis can usefully recalibrate other traditional 
theoretical justifications for criminal law. For utilitarians, this new emphasis holds 
promise for addressing the delegitimization and reduced deterrent effect of 
criminal justice systems for those excluded from system generation and oversight. 
Democracy enhancement’s prioritization of self-governance also can productively 
refine rehabilitative theory by directing efforts toward fuller integration of 
individuals-in-community and citizens into the polity. With respect to restorative 
justice, enhancing self-governance by redressing real and perceived disparities in 
power, authority, and privilege within and across the systems in which crime and 
punishment are generated can improve possibilities for—and, indeed, is likely 
prerequisite to—personal healing and mending of broken relationships.  
 
D.  Resources for Theory Building 
 
Future work will hone this quick sketch of a democracy-enhancing theory for 
criminal law and procedure. There are a number of resources for the task. Again, 
pragmatism entails eclecticism. Theory development should be interdisciplinary. 
Debates among criminologists are salient, particularly as they contest the racial 
invariance of concentrated disadvantage as a factor causing criminal justice 
involvement.147 Social psychology and other cognitive sciences, including 
developmental neurobiology, also have much to offer. Pertinent areas of 
investigation include identification of factors that contribute to or hinder resiliency 
in the face of stress,148 as well as discussions of the existence, verifiability, and 
146 Regina Austin, “The Black Community,” Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of 
Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1774–87 (1992). 
147 On the debate over racial invariance in the relationship between concentrated 
disadvantage and crime, compare Sampson & Bean, supra note 38, at 8, 11 (discussing 
“resilient” invariance findings related to “factors representing disadvantage, e.g., differing 
combinations of poverty, income, family disruption, and joblessness/unemployment”), with 
Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Structural Disadvantage and 
Crime: White, Black, and Hispanic Comparisons, 93 SOC. SCI. Q. 799, 800 (2012) (“[T]he 
degree to which differences across groups in structural disadvantage predict racial or ethnic 
differences in violence is far from settled.”). 
148 See, e.g., M.E.M. Haglund et al., Psychobiological Mechanisms of Resilience: 
Relevance to Prevention and Treatment of Stress-Related Psychopathology, 19 
DEVELOPMENT & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 889, 894–96 tbl.1, 906 tbl.2, 910 tbl.3 (2007) 
(summarizing neurochemical, neurological, and behavioral linkages to traumatic stress and 
resiliency). 
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implications of implicit or unconscious bias—whether those biases are rooted in 
differences between racial or ethnic groups, socioeconomic classes, or gender 
identities.149  
As a leading skeptic on the role of both implicit bias and conscious 
discrimination in causing racial disparities in the workplace, Professor Amy Wax 
notes that calls to redress underlying “pervasive substantive inequalities” tend to 
“say very little about how to do that.”150 In addition to the resources noted above, 
the scholarship of Professor Matthew Adler in social welfare economics, as well as 
that of Professors Iris Marion Young and Seyla Benhabib in political philosophy, 
offers useful framing devices to at least begin saying more “about how to do that” 
descriptive and normative work. 
Development of a democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law and procedure 
resonates with Adler’s pathbreaking work on fair distribution as central to 
inequality-averse social welfare economic theory.151 Adler’s framing of social 
welfare economic theory emphasizes the discipline’s normative clout.152 He resists 
the prevalent cabining of utilitarian well-being to the satisfaction of personal 
preference. He deduces a formula for evaluating the contribution of decision 
outcomes to enhanced individual well-being with priority given to improving the 
lot of the less well-off. Significant for purposes of developing a democracy-
enhancing theory of criminal law and procedure, Adler acknowledges the need to 
account for the extent to which individuals shape their own opportunities and life 
histories.153 Personal responsibility, or free will, must be incorporated as a variable 
in his economic calculus. 
In the field of political philosophy, Young and Benhabib provide feminist 
revisions of critical theory’s discourse model. These scholars work with the 
model’s three core commitments: (1) communication and, more specifically, 
rational argument is constitutive of human identity; (2) an ideal speech situation 
requires commitment to consensus, such that all who are affected by a discourse 
outcome agree to that outcome (the universalization principle); and (3) all 
149 See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Supply Side or Discrimination?, Assessing the Role of 
Unconscious Bias, 83 TEMPLE L. REV. 877, 887–902 (2011) (surveying literature and 
challenging empirical support for unconscious bias as a causal factor capable of objective 
proof or redress through law). But see, e.g., State v. Golphin, Nos. 97 CRS 47314–15, 98 
CRS 34832, 30544, & 01 CRS 65079 at 2, 20–24, 90–95 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Dec. 13, 2012) 
(vacating death sentences based in part on prosecutors’ implicit racial biases against 
African American prospective jurors), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/rja_or 
der_12-13-12.pdf.  
150 Wax, supra note 149, at 900–02 (discussing Ralph Richard Banks & Richard 
Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial 
Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053 (2009)). 
151 See Janet Moore, G Forces: Gideon v. Wainwright and Matthew Adler’s Move 
Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis, 11 SEATTLE J. SOCIAL JUSTICE 1025, 1036 (2013) (“An 
economic theory that shifts the analysis from gross satisfaction of personal preference to 
inequality reduction can be a powerful tool for public defense reform advocates.” 
(discussing ADLER, supra note 37)). 
152 ADLER, supra note 37, at 12 (describing cost-benefit analysis as “a kind of moral 
decision procedure”). 
153 Id. at 36–38. 
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interested parties must have equal and unhindered access to full participation in the 
conversation (the discourse principle).154 Young and Benhabib insist that the 
intersubjective communication that is the core of democratic processes and 
outcomes requires mining messy, highly particularized, real-world differences 
among people.155 That process in turn requires satisfaction of basic material needs 
that are prerequisites to participation.156  
Young’s reframing of critical theory’s discourse model may be particularly 
helpful in fleshing out a democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law and 
procedure. She prioritizes three questions: Who is at the table? Who is speaking or 
purporting to speak for whom? Who is privileging which manner of 
communication?157 These questions must remain front and center in addressing the 
democracy deficit at the intersection of crime, race, and poverty. 
In Young’s assessment, adversarialism is built into consensus generation as a 
necessary oppositional moment. Deliberation requires capacities for “no-
saying,”158 self-reflection, and reality checking as participants struggle to see, hear, 
and understand contentions raised from perspectives different from their own. In 
Young’s phrasing, “struggle is a process of communicative engagement” between 
members of a democratic society; because the “field of struggle is not level[,] . . . 
[d]isorderly, disruptive, annoying, or distracting means of communication are often 
necessary.”159 Young therefore resists moves to restrict discourses or their mode of 
expression to formal argument, appeals to a common good, or those that some 
label as moderate and civil. 
By retaining discourse theory’s dual emphases on equal access to deliberative 
processes and the production of genuine consensus, Young distinguishes her 
“agonistic” description of democratic formation as struggle from liberal theory’s 
“aggregative model.”160 In her view, the latter entails zero-sum, majoritarian 
competition among ostensibly morally neutral policy preferences—a competition 
that fails to afford adequate structural protections against the perpetuation and 
reinforcement of “might makes right” dominance.161 In contrast, a theory that is 
fully attentive to particularized differences of other-regarding equals obtains a 
richer capacity for intersubjective transformation and the reshaping of “private, 
self-regarding desire into public appeals to justice.”162 
154 See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 22–51 (2000); Seyla 
Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY AND 
DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 67, 69–74, 78, 81–87 
(Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996). 
155 See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 154, at 37–44. 
156 Iris Marion Young, Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative 
Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 154, at 120, 121; Benhabib, 
supra note 154, at 67, 84. 
157 YOUNG, supra note 154, at 37–44. 
158 Stephen K. White & Evan Farr, “No-Saying” in Habermas, 40 POL. THEORY 32, 
33 (2012). 
159 YOUNG, supra note 154, at 50–51. 
160 Id. at 49–51. 
161 Id. at 50–51. 
162 Id. 
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It is in this possibility of intersubjective transformation that the messy 
struggle toward democracy—power of the people—converges with the elusive 
goal of isonomia: mutuality in generation and administration of the law. Critics 
question whether that possibility can be actualized on any meaningful scale and 
challenge the real-world efficacy of both social welfare economics163 and 
deliberativist models as avenues toward change.164 
For example, skeptics focus both on the improbability of any broad, 
sustainable will to engage in such communication165 and the inefficiency of 
oppositional, self-reflective moments that inevitably become to a greater or lesser 
degree “[d]isorderly, disruptive, annoying, or distracting.”166 Recent empirical 
research supports a more hopeful view.167 For example, people want to engage in 
face-to-face deliberation on policy matters—and seize opportunities to do so, 
including across boundaries of class, race, and ethnicity—more readily than 
skeptics might anticipate.168 And in some circumstances, “deliberative drift” 
allows communication to shift back and forth across the border between zero-sum 
negotiations and richer normative discourse, trust-building, and engagement 
toward consensus building.169 
But a more pointed criticism highlights the challenges and failures of efforts 
to empower those at the receiving end of systems. The low-income and minority 
communities most directly and disproportionately affected by crime, its causes, 
and its consequences face onerous obstacles to active participation in the 
formation, implementation, and oversight of the policies and institutions that create 
and maintain those systems.170 Parts III through V respond to that concern by 
testing the rudimentary democracy-enhancement theory sketched here. They do so 
163 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 151, at 1045–50 (engaging critiques of Adler’s work).  
164 See, e.g., Christopher H. Schroeder, Deliberative Democracy’s Attempt to Turn 
Politics into Law, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95, 115–16 (2002) (“the demands of 
deliberation . . . are so onerous that there are good reasons to believe they cannot be 
achieved by human society as currently constituted—as deliberativists themselves 
concede.” (citing AMY GUTMAN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 
357 (1996)). 
165 Id. at 124–27 (concluding that “[t]he behavior necessary to satisfy the demands of 
deliberation stands quite outside anything that can be achieved”). 
166 YOUNG, supra note 154, at 50. 
167 Taslitz, supra note 81, at 168–73.  
168 See, e.g., Jane Mansbridge et al., The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power 
in Deliberative Democracy, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 64, 73–74 (2010); Michael A. Neblo et al., 
Who Wants to Deliberate—and Why?, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 566, 574–75 (2010) (finding 
younger people, lower-income people, and minorities are more willing to deliberate than 
predicted); see also Benhabib, supra note 154, at 73–74, 84–87 (discussing deliberation 
through “multiple forms of associations, networks, and organizations” and concluding that 
“the deliberative theory of democracy is not a theory in search of practice; rather it . . . 
elucidate[s] . . . the logic of existing democratic practice”). 
169 Peter McLaverty & Darren Halpin, Deliberative Drift: The Emergence of 
Deliberation in the Policy Process, 29 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 197, 202–04, 208 (2008). 
170 See, e.g., Bach, Welfare Reform, supra note 92, at 307–18 (discussing the 
empowerment of historically “less-powerful groups” to attain a collaborative government). 
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by mapping a previously unnoticed constellation of criminal justice reforms in a 
single and improbable jurisdiction, the border-south state of North Carolina. 
 
III.  A PRETTY QUESTION: WHY NORTH CAROLINA? 
 
Given the depth and intransigence of the resource disparities encountered in 
circumstances of concentrated disadvantage and the correspondingly limited 
political capital of the low-income and minority communities that 
disproportionately experience crime and criminal justice systems, reform 
initiatives within these systems are remarkable—and should be remarked upon.171 
It is especially interesting to find a constellation of cutting-edge reforms in a single 
jurisdiction seldom seen as a hotbed of progressive politics.172 North Carolina is a 
case in point.173  
This jurisdiction was the first in the nation to adopt mandatory, statewide full 
open-file discovery in criminal cases.174 Full open-file discovery resulted from 
hard-fought litigation and the opportunistic exploitation of what was, by all 
appearances, a wholly unpromising political moment.175 Despite pushback from 
prosecutors, the case law and legislative history have continued to trend toward 
greater openness and enforceability.176 
171 See Moore, supra note 13, at 1375–77; cf. Jennifer E. Laurin, Still Convicting the 
Innocent, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1473, 1499 (2012) (reviewing BRANDON L. GARRETT, 
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011) and 
querying institutional explanations for North Carolina’s distinctive Innocence Inquiry 
Commission). Some remark that things could be worse. See Darryl K. Brown, Democracy 
and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 234–48 (2007) (describing the “substantially 
contracted” field of criminal law’s effect on “most people” and the failure of many tough-
on-crime bills in three state legislatures); cf. VANESSA BARKER, THE POLITICS OF 
IMPRISONMENT: HOW THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS SHAPES THE WAY AMERICA PUNISHES 
OFFENDERS 111–12 (2009) (citing failed proposals to require killing or castrating sex 
offenders in Washington’s Community Protection Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010–
.903 (1990)). 
172 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Editorial Bd., The Decline of North Carolina, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/opinion/the-decline-of-north-carolina. 
html?_r=0 (discussing “Moral Monday” protests against “the grotesque damage that a new 
Republican majority has been doing to a tradition of caring for the least fortunate”). 
173 Aspects of the analysis in this Part are drawn from the Brief of Amici Curiae 
Historians and Law Professors in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Appropriate Relief 
Pursuant to the Racial Justice Act, State v. Al-Bayyinah, No. 98 CRS 836, 1009 (Davie 
County, N.C. Sup. Ct. Sept. 15, 2010), which the Author researched and wrote after 
representing Mr. al-Bayyinah on direct appeal. State v. al-Bayyinah, 567 S.E.2d 120 (N.C. 
2002) (vacating convictions and death sentence); State v. al-Bayyinah, 616 S.E.2d 500 
(N.C. 2005) (affirming convictions and death sentence after retrial), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 
1076 (2006). 
174 Moore, supra note 13, at 1378–79.  
175 Id. at 1379. 
176 Id. at 1379–84. That trend is due in part to legislative accommodation of prosecut-
orial concerns for fair accountability and enforceability with respect to investigative 
agencies that possess discoverable material without prosecutors’ knowledge or control. Id. 
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But full open-file discovery is just one of several pioneering criminal justice 
reforms in this single and unlikely jurisdiction. As discussed in more detail in Part 
IV, other cutting-edge reforms have focused on identifying and reducing wrongful 
convictions; increasing efficiency and lessening cost; and curing demographic 
disparities in criminal offending and victimization as well as in the processing of 
criminal cases. Before describing that constellation of reforms, this Part searches 
the state’s socioeconomic and political history for some clues about their genesis. 
Hunting for hints of democracy enhancement at the intersection of race, crime, and 
poverty reveals a pattern better described as democracy assaulting. 
 
A.  Race, Populism, and Tar Heel Politics: An Introduction 
 
North Carolina’s previously unheralded leadership in criminal justice reform 
raises what historian V.O. Key, Jr. described in 1949 as the “pretty question” 
regarding jurisdictional motivations and aptitudes for change.177 Key’s opus, 
Southern Politics in State and Nation, is best known for developing racial threat 
analysis and linking it to what was then a distinctively weak adversarial partisan 
politics across southern states.178  
Key labeled North Carolina as the South’s “Progressive Plutocracy.”179 He 
saw the state as “far more ‘presentable’ than its southern neighbors” in business, 
education, “race relations . . . [and] scrupulously orderly” political processes.180 He 
praised the state’s “consistently sensitive appreciation of Negro rights” and “spirit 
of self-examination” driven in part by a strong commitment to public education.181 
Key left much untold. He ignored or belittled the active role African 
Americans played in crafting their own political and economic destiny.182 He 
papered over the state’s history of murderous racial violence.183 He was inattentive 
177 V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 208 (1949) (“What 
moves a people to action . . . is a pretty question.”). 
178 Id. at 5–11; see also Dan T. Carter, More than Race: Conservatism in the White 
South Since V.O. Key Jr., in UNLOCKING V.O. KEY JR.: “SOUTHERN POLITICS” FOR THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 130 (Angie Maxwell & Todd G. Shields eds., 2011) [hereinafter 
UNLOCKING KEY] (summarizing Key’s racial threat analysis). Scholars rank Southern 
Politics as “easily comparable” to Myrdal’s An American Dilemma and Woodward’s The 
Strange Career of Jim Crow. Ronald Keith Gaddie & Justin J. Wert, Before KKV, V.O. Key 
Jr.: Southern Politics and Social Science Methodology, in UNLOCKING KEY at 77–78, 84. 
179 KEY, supra note 177, at 205. 
180 Id. In Key’s view, the state’s political leadership was “stodgy and conservative” 
but never consisted of “scoundrels or nincompoops.” Id. at 211. 
181 Id. at 209. 
182 Kari Frederickson, World War II, White Violence, and Black Politics in V.O. Key 
Jr.’s Southern Politics, in UNLOCKING KEY, supra note 178, at 39, 39–41 (chiding Key’s 
“secondary interest” in “[w]hat actual black people might have been doing” to shape the 
political landscape); Carter, supra note 178, at 129–30 (describing Key’s treatment of 
African American southerners as passive victims); id. at 138 (describing interlocking roles 
of race and class in southern political culture). 
183 KEY, supra note 177, at 208 (describing the violent white supremacist revolution 
against biracial Fusionist governments as a “bitter” campaign through which Democrats 
redeemed the state from “shameless corruption”). Reconstruction-era corruption in North 
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to class differences and elided the conditions of the working poor who operated the 
textile and tobacco mills owned by the state’s “economic oligarchy.”184 He failed 
to account for the pivotal role of evangelical Christianity in the formation of 
southern politics, and he also ignored the role of women.185 
Despite these omissions, aspects of Key’s description accurately reflect a 
powerful mythos that continues to shape perception and action in North 
Carolina.186 A broad progressive streak runs sometimes beneath, sometimes 
alongside, and almost always against strains of conservatism and reactionary 
extremism. Key emphasized the former aspect of the state’s Janus-faced 
sociopolitical culture.187 Frank Porter Graham and Terry Sanford are typically 
identified with this lesser-known aspect.188 In contrast, for many, the state’s 
dominant aspect is indelibly embodied in Jesse Helms, “an unyielding icon of 
conservatives and archenemy of liberals.”189  
For thirty years, North Carolina voters sent Helms to the U.S. Senate as a 
champion of low taxes, small government, free markets, and traditional social 
values. As one voter put it, it was impossible to “get to the right of Helms without 
falling plumb off the Earth.” Some put Helms alongside Ronald Reagan as a key 
catalyst and communicator of conservatism’s resurgence in the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries.190 Nationally syndicated political columnist David 
Carolina was dominated by whites and “transcended party lines.” See, e.g., ERIC FONER, 
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 387–89 (1984). 
184 KEY, supra note 177, at 211–15. 
185 Charles Reagan Wilson, The Morality-Driven South: Populists, Prohibitionists, 
Religion, and V.O. Key Jr.’s Southern Politics, in UNLOCKING KEY, supra note 178, at 3–5 
(critiquing Key’s failure to account for the role of evangelical Christianity in the formation 
of southern politics); Carter, supra note 178, at 129–30 (describing Key’s failures to 
account for the role of women).  
186 Mythos is not “something antithetical to fact . . . opposed to reality . . . primitive or 
arbitrary.” Martin L. Bowles, Myth, Meaning, and Work Organization, 10 ORG. STUD. 405, 
406–08 (1989). Mythology comprises deeply rooted interpretive constructs invoked to 
make sense of the world and one’s role within it. See id. The concept poses no challenge to 
sociologists’ view of culture as practice. See Sampson & Bean, supra note 38, at 27–28. 
187 KEY, supra note 177, at 205–10 (summarizing the history of North Carolina’s 
“Progressive Plutocracy”). But see supra notes 182–185 and accompanying text (critiquing 
omissions in Key’s analysis); ROB CHRISTENSEN, THE PARADOX OF TAR HEEL POLITICS: 
THE PERSONALITIES, ELECTIONS, AND EVENTS THAT SHAPED MODERN NORTH CAROLINA 
1–3 (2008) (noting the difficulty of “pigeonhol[ing]” North Carolina politics); Franco 
Ordonez, Attention North Carolina Is Getting Isn’t Quite What It Wants, MCCLATCHY 
WASH. BUREAU (May 25, 2012), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/05/25/150208/attentio 
n-north-carolina-is-getting.html (describing Paul Luebke’s division of the state’s cultural 
actors between “modernizers and traditionalists”).  
188 CHRISTENSEN, supra note 187, at 3; ROBERT R. KORSTAD & JAMES L. LELOUDIS, 
TO RIGHT THESE WRONGS: THE NORTH CAROLINA FUND AND THE BATTLE TO END 
POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN 1960S AMERICA 12 (2010).  
189 David S. Broder, Jesse Helms, White Racist, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2001, reposted 
July 7, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/ 
06/AR2008070602321.html. 
190 WILLIAM A. LINK, RIGHTEOUS WARRIOR: JESSE HELMS AND THE RISE OF MODERN 
CONSERVATISM 5–9 (2008); see also Larry J. Sabato, The Political Parties and PACs: 
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Broder also described Helms as the nation’s “last prominent unabashed white 
racist politician.”191  
The roots of North Carolina’s racialized politics run deep and are particularly 
tangled at the intersection of race, crime, and poverty. Historically, the State’s 
formation and application of criminal law and procedure, like the use of extralegal 
violence, have been closely focused on the intersection of race, class, and gender 
hierarchies. Colonial slave codes morphed into nineteenth-century black codes, 
which sprang into new life in post-Reconstruction Jim Crow laws. Such shape-
shifting typically responded to socioeconomic and political advances by African 
Americans.192 The pattern is evident in North Carolina’s racialized application of 
court-sanctioned and extralegal executions as well as in other instances of mass 
political violence. As discussed below, that pattern began in the colonial period 
and developed in an economy dependent on low-cost labor. 
 
B.  From Slave Codes to the Wilmington Massacre 
 
Of the nearly 800 judicially sanctioned executions carried out in North 
Carolina’s first 235 years as a colony and a state, more than 70% targeted African 
Americans; during the same period, three whites were executed for crimes against 
African Americans.193 Aggravated forms of execution, including burning at the 
stake, were reserved for “petit treason”—the uniquely threatening offenses of slave 
revolt and husband killing.194 The imbalanced application of capital punishment 
was so profound and long-standing that even after the advent of the electric chair, 
Novel Relationships in the New System of Campaign Finance, 3 J.L. & POL. 423, 433 
(1987). 
191 Broder, supra note 189; see also CHRISTENSEN, supra note 187, at 269 (describing 
Helms’s nationally televised response to the phoned-in suggestion that he receive “a Nobel 
Peace Prize for everything [he had] done to help keep down the niggers”); Linda Chavez, 
Race to the Finish: The Supreme Court and the FCC’s Racial Preference Program, 44 
ARK. L. REV. 1097, 1104–05 (1991) (attributing a racially charged campaign 
advertisement’s effectiveness in part to the opposing candidate’s self-dealing use of 
Federal Communications Commission affirmative action policies); Earl Sheridan, Book 
Review, 123 POL. SCI. Q. 515, 517 (2008) (reviewing Mark A. Smith, THE RIGHT TALK: 
HOW CONSERVATIVES TRANSFORMED THE GREAT SOCIETY INTO THE ECONOMIC SOCIETY 
(2007) and describing famous “white hands” television advertisement from the 1990 Helms 
Senate campaign); Jesse Helms “Hands” Ad, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v 
=KIyewCdXMzk (last visited Apr. 3, 2014) (video of “white hands” campaign 
advertisement).  
192 JAMES BALDWIN, My Dungeon Shook: Letter to My Nephew on the One-
Hundredth Anniversary of the Emancipation, in THE PRICE OF THE TICKET: COLLECTED 
NONFICTION 1948–1985, at 336 (1985) (“[T]he black man has functioned in the white 
man’s world as a fixed star, as an immovable pillar: and as he moves out of his place, 
heaven and earth are shaken to their foundations.”).  
193 Seth Kotch & Robert P. Mosteller, The Racial Justice Act and the Long Struggle 
with Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2031, 2038–39, 
2043–49, 2053–56 (2010). 
194 Stuart Banner, Traces of Slavery: Race and the Death Penalty in Historical 
Perspective, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN AMERICA 103–04 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006). 
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one white man slit his own throat instead of becoming “the first white man 
electrocuted in North Carolina.”195 
In the antebellum era, Gabriel’s uprising, Nat Turner’s rebellion, and the 
circulation of David Walker’s revolutionary Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the 
World led to slave-owner hysteria.196 Tortured slaves “confessed” to plotting 
rebellion. Some were burned at the stake or beheaded. The decapitated heads were 
mounted on stakes to inspire terror and submission.197 The state legislature soon 
stripped free blacks of voting rights.198 Additional new laws forbade slaves and 
free blacks from preaching, teaching, or public speaking in any forum.199 Teaching 
literacy to African Americans became a crime.200 
Reactionary violence also marred Reconstruction. For example, freed blacks 
and whites formed Union Leagues in the pursuit of political and economic self-
education and advocacy (as well as in self-defense).201 Ku Klux Klan thuggery 
soon eliminated that cooperation.202 Despite such violent suppression, in the 1870s, 
while other Southern states fell to Redemptionist takeovers, North Carolina 
retained a Republican governor and rejected a revanchist white-supremacist 
constitution.203 
Then, in 1892 and 1894, low-income farm workers and other rural white 
Populists joined with black and white Republicans to take the governor’s mansion, 
the state legislature, and several local governmental councils, commissions, and 
appointed positions from Democrats.204 These Fusionists sought to increase “the 
liberty of the laboring people, both white and black.”205 They “capped interest rates 
on personal debt, increased expenditures for public education, shifted the weight of 
taxation from individuals to corporations and railroads, and made generous 
appropriations to state charitable and correctional institutions.”206 They also 
expanded voting rights and local democracy, instituting city and county elections 
in place of legislatively appointed authorities.207  
195 Kotch & Mosteller, supra note 193, at 2039 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also id. at 2043–56 (examining the history of race and executions in North Carolina). 
196 Stephen Kantrowitz, The Two Faces of Domination in North Carolina, 1800–
1898, in DEMOCRACY BETRAYED, supra note 46, at 97–102. 
197 DAVID S. CECELSKI, THE WATERMAN’S SONG: SLAVERY AND FREEDOM IN 
MARITIME NORTH CAROLINA 53–54 (2001). 
198 TIMOTHY B. TYSON, BLOOD DONE SIGN MY NAME 132 (2004). 
199 Id. 
200 See id.; see also N.C. Sch. for the Deaf & Dumb v. N.C. Inst. for the Deaf, Dumb 
& Blind, 23 S.E. 171, 172 (N.C. 1895). 
201 See TYSON, supra note 198, at 282–85; FONER, supra note 183, at 283–84 (citing 
the North Carolina Union League chapter as exemplifying the “remarkable degree of 
interracial harmony” that existed within some local leagues). 
202 FONER, supra note 183, at 344, 427–31 (describing reports from one North 
Carolina judicial district of murders, rapes, arson, and hundreds of beatings in anti-Union 
League violence). 
203 Id. at 444. 
204 KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 11–12. 
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This “historic experiment in interracial democracy” came to an abrupt and 
violent end with the Wilmington massacre of 1898.208 Part of a statewide and 
national white-supremacy movement, the 1898 revolution shackled the state with 
decades of Jim Crow rule.209 At the time, Wilmington was North Carolina’s largest 
city and had an active and prosperous black majority.210 Wilmington was also a 
Fusionist stronghold. But the depression of 1893 and blacks’ growing political and 
economic success stoked white resentment.211 
Local whites plotted a violent resurgence.212 Like their counterparts across the 
state and nation, they drew on nascent theories of social Darwinism and scientific 
racism to insist that “North Carolina is a white man’s state, and white men will rule 
it . . . .”213 The media added fuel to the fire. In the run-up to the 1898 elections, 
newspapers put racist cartoons on the front page. Examples include a black 
vampire labeled “NEGRO RULE” emerging from a Fusionist ballot box to ensnare 
fleeing white victims in fearsome claws: 214  
 
 
On the eve of the 1898 election, Alfred C. Waddell, a former U.S. 
congressman, incited murder: “You are Anglo-Saxons. . . . You are armed and 
208 Cecelski & Tyson, supra note 46, at xiv. 
209 Id. at xiv–xv.  
210 WILMINGTON REPORT, supra note 104, at 35, 46–52; Michael Honey, Class, Race, 
and Power in the New South: Racial Violence and the Delusions of White Supremacy, in 
DEMOCRACY BETRAYED, supra note 46, at 174. 
211 See WILMINGTON REPORT, supra note 104, at 52. 
212 Id. at 52–53. 
213 Raymond Gavins, Fear, Hope, and Struggle: Recasting Black North Carolina in 
the Age of Jim Crow, in DEMOCRACY BETRAYED, supra note 46, at 188. 
214 Election 1898 Political Cartoons in the News & Observer, UNIV. OF N.C., http:// 
www2.lib.unc.edu/ncc/1898/sources/cartoons/0927.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2014) (image 
entitled The Vampire That Hovers Over North Carolina); see also id. (images entitled 
Remember! and A Warning. Get Back! We Will not Stand It). 
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prepared . . . . [I]f you find the negro out voting, tell him to leave the polls, and if 
he refuses, kill him.”215 Across the state, the Klan and the Red Shirts—organized 
gangs of working-class whites—used rifles and shotguns to turn the election.216 
The Wilmington faction issued a “White Declaration of Independence,” destroyed 
the local black newspaper, and began killing “every damn nigger in sight.” 
Estimated death tolls range from 9 to 300 or more.217 All elected Fusionist leaders 
were forced to resign at gunpoint, marched to the train station, and banished from 
the city.218 Local Christian pastors praised the homicidal violence as “God’s 
service”219 and “a mere incident,” reasoning that “[y]ou cannot make an omelet 
without breaking an egg.”220 
 
C.  Resurgent White Supremacy 
 
With the Democrat white-supremacist takeover complete, statewide 
regulations soon disenfranchised blacks, barred them from jury service, and 
replaced previously common patterns of integrated housing with systematic 
apartheid that “thoroughly ‘sorted’ along lines of race and class.”221 Support for 
black schools dropped from parity to fifty-four cents on the dollar.222 A key 
booster of the Red Shirt revolution, Raleigh News & Observer publisher Josephus 
Daniels, celebrated such developments as “permanent good government by the 
party of the White Man.”223 The new governor, Charles Brantley Aycock, 
explained that the rule of law required the “white man’s party . . . [to] disfranchise 
the negro . . . while we work out the industrial, commercial, intellectual and moral 
development of the State.”224  
That working out has taken some time. Half a century later, black veterans of 
World War II came home intent on a “double-V” campaign to defeat oppression at 
215 Glenda E. Gilmore, Murder, Memory, and the Flight of the Incubus, in 
DEMOCRACY BETRAYED, supra note 46, at 84–85. 
216 A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions with 
Devastating Racial Consequences, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1606–07 (1994).  
217 Timothy B. Tyson, The Ghosts of 1898: Wilmington’s Race Riot and the Rise of 
White Supremacy, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Nov. 17, 2006, at 1A. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. (quoting the Reverend J.W. Kramer). 
220 John Haley, Race, Rhetoric, and Revolution, in DEMOCRACY BETRAYED, supra 
note 46, at 209 (quoting Reverend Calvin S. Blackwell of Wilmington’s First Baptist 
Church). 
221 KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 17; Gavins, supra note 213, at 190–91. 
222 STEWART E. TOLNAY & E. M. BECK, A FESTIVAL OF VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF 
SOUTHERN LYNCHINGS, 1882–1930, at 84–85 n.57 (1995); KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra 
note 188, at 16. 
223 J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE 
RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880–1910, at 76 
(1974); see also JOHN HALEY, CHARLES N. HUNTER AND RACE RELATIONS IN NORTH 
CAROLINA 214–15, 284 (George B. Tindall et al. eds., 1987). 
224 KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 14–15. 
 
                                                     
580 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
home as well as overseas.225 As race riots exploded in other cities, Governor J. 
Melville Broughton warned against protests linked to racial integration. He chose 
an auspicious site to give his speech. At the mouth of the Cape Fear River in 
Wilmington—the same river that Red Shirt revolutionary Alfred Waddell had 
threatened to choke with black bodies—the governor reminded the crowd that 
“blood flowed freely in the streets of this city” in 1898 and might again if 
“agitators” did not cease efforts whose “ultimate conclusion would result only in a 
mongrel race.”226 
Similar threatening references to the violent anti-Fusionist rebellion tainted 
North Carolina’s hotly contested Democratic primary race for the Senate in 1950. 
Willis Smith’s supporters attacked “bloc voting” (i.e., black voting) for incumbent 
Frank Porter Graham as a repeat of “THEIR REIGN not so many years ago” and 
as the looming return of “carpet-bag rule.”227 Other flyers screamed, “WHITE 
PEOPLE WAKE UP BEFORE IT’S TOO LATE,” warning that a vote for Graham 
was a vote for “Northern political labor leaders” and “mingling of the races,” with 
blacks working in the same factories, eating in the same restaurants, riding the 
same public transit, studying in the same schools, and sleeping in hotels and 
hospitals “with you, your wife and daughters.”228  
The civil rights era saw continued hardening of political rhetoric and action in 
North Carolina as in other parts of the nation. In the 1960 gubernatorial race, the 
campaign of segregationist candidate Beverly Lake vowed not to “sit idly by . . . 
and let the NAACP and other evil outside influences make a mockery of North 
Carolina . . . [and] our way of life.”229 
By 1965, North Carolina had more Klan activity than any other state, with a 
larger dues-paying membership than Alabama and Mississippi combined.230 North 
Carolina’s Klan has remained active in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries. In the 1980s, fifteen robed Klansmen gathered outside a county jail to 
225 Id. at 22; see also Kari Frederickson, World War II, White Violence, and Black 
Politics in V.O. Key Jr.’s Southern Politics, in UNLOCKING KEY, supra note 178, at 39–46 
(discussing how World War II was a critical event in the origins of the black freedom 
struggle). 
226 Timothy B. Tyson, Wars for Democracy: African American Militancy and 
Interracial Violence in North Carolina During World War II, in DEMOCRACY BETRAYED, 
supra note 46, at 253–54. 
227 Jonathan Gentry, All That’s Not Fit to Print: Anticommunist and White 
Supremacist Campaign Literature in the 1950 North Carolina Democratic Senate Primary, 
82 N.C. HIST. REV. 33, 48–49 (2005) (emphasis in original). 
228 KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 26 (emphasis in original). In turn, flyers 
supporting Graham warned that Smith’s election would return white workers to twelve-
hour days at pennies per hour and lead to reinstitution of child labor. Id. at 27; see also 
Gavin Wright, Cheap Labor and Southern Textiles, 1880–1930, 96 Q. J. ECON. 605, 609–
611 tbls.I, II & III (1981) (documenting use of child labor in North Carolina textile mills 
between 1880 and 1920); id. at 607, 626–29 (attributing industry decline to “dramatic 
increase in real wage costs” with decline of child labor). 
229 Gene R. Nichol, Bill Aycock and the North Carolina Speaker Ban Law, 79 N.C. L. 
REV. 1725, 1727–28 (2001). 
230 GREENSBORO TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N, FINAL REPORT 101 (2006), 
available at http://www.greensborotrc.org/pre1979_kkk.pdf. 
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offer the $50,000 bond for a black man charged with raping a white victim.231 A 
local pastor spoke out publicly against the Klan.232 A cross was burned on his 
lawn, and nineteen shots were fired into the home where he and his family were 
sleeping.233 When Klansmen killed five anti-Klan protesters in Greensboro, all-
white juries acquitted the charged defendants.234 More recent strange fruit includes 
an Imperial Wizard’s May 2012 homage to “white unity” at a cross-burning and 
new-member induction ceremony near the small town of Harmony, North 
Carolina.235  
Of course, such conduct is not confined to North Carolina,236 nor to the 
South.237 But it was one of North Carolina’s Supreme Court justices who observed 
during lynching’s twentieth-century heyday that “the Lynch law of our country has 
a very ancient and respectable pedigree.”238 In the same era, the state’s chief 
justice expressly and repeatedly urged speedier judicially sanctioned executions as 
a cure for lynching.239 At the time, North Carolina tracked trends around the 
231 Ashley Halsey, In N.C., the Klan’s Cry of ‘White Power’ is Growing Louder, 
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug. 24, 1984, at A1. 
232 Id. 
233 Id.  
234 GREENSBORO TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF 
FINAL REPORT 2, http://www.greensborotrc.org/exec_summary.pdf. In contrast, a few years 
later capital juries spared two white defendants from the death penalty despite their openly 
racist crimes of hunting down and executing a black couple to earn coveted spider tattoos. 
Second Ex-Paratrooper Gets Life in North Carolina Racial Killings, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 
1997, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/13/us/second-ex-paratrooper-
gets-life-in-north-carolina-racial-killings.html?ref=michael_james. 
235 KKK Hold Rally in NC Town of 600, WFMY NEWS (May 27, 2012, 8:02 AM), 
http://www.digtriad.com/news/watercooler/article/230081/176/KKK-Hold-Rally-In-NC-To 
wn-Of-600 [hereafter KKK Hold Rally]; cf. STRANGE FRUIT (California Newsreel 2002) 
(linking history of lynchings with Klan rallies in the writing and popularization of jazz 
classic). 
236 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 349 (2003) (discussing incidents of cross 
burning and defendants’ threats to “take a .30/.30 and just random[ly] shoot the blacks” 
(alteration in original)). 
237 See, e.g., Kathy Lynn Gray, Man Gets 30 Days for Burning Cross, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH (June 22, 2012, 10:21 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/ 
06/22/man-gets-30-days-for-burning-cross.html (discussing federal sentencing for Ohio 
cross burning). 
238 State v. Lewis, 55 S.E. 600, 610 (N.C. 1906) (Brown, J., dissenting) (quoting “[a] 
most interesting writer in the American Law Register, Mr. John Marshall Gest”). Justice 
Brown would have affirmed the trial court’s quashing of the indictment on the basis that 
lynching was neither a common-law nor a statutorily defined offense. Id. at 610–11.  
239 E.g., State v. Neville, 95 S.E. 55, 59 (N.C. 1918); State v. Cameron, 81 S.E. 748, 
751 (N.C. 1914); State v. Cole, 44 S.E. 391, 397, 399 (N.C. 1903) (Clark, C.J., dissenting); 
State v. Rhyne, 33 S.E. 128, 135–36 (N.C. 1899) (Clark, C.J. dissenting); see also Walter 
Clark, True Remedy for Lynch Law, 28 AM. L. REV. 801, 806 (1894) (“To have [a 
deterrent] effect the punishment must be prompt and certain whenever guilt is clear beyond 
all reasonable doubt. This principle which is so often ignored by the courts is the one which 
instinctively actuates lynching mobs.”). But see Neville, 95 S.E. at 60 (Brown, Walker, 
Hoke, and Allen, JJ., concurring) (finding “no unreasonable delay” in processing North 
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country in that nearly 90% of the state’s 168 recorded lynchings between 1865 and 
1941 victimized blacks,240 with at least twenty-five black men lynched between 
1900 and 1918 alone.241 In North Carolina, as elsewhere, the line separating court-
sanctioned executions from extralegal vigilantism often blurred.242 
 
D.  Race, Class, Labor, and the War on Poverty 
 
North Carolina’s racially imbalanced application of state-sanctioned and 
private violence devolved in an economy dependent on low-cost labor. After the 
1898 white supremacist revolution, the state’s textile and tobacco industries began 
a period of explosive growth. Most nonfactory workers were sharecroppers.243 
And, as reflected in the “WHITE PEOPLE WAKE UP” flyer, factory work was 
considered “whites only” for decades, particularly in the textile industry.244 
The tobacco industry was integrated, but shop foremen were white and the 
dirtiest work was reserved for African American employees. Black tobacco 
workers engaged in significant union organizing; ensuing self-education projects 
and voter drives shifted the balance in some local elections. Occasionally there was 
some interracial cooperation within and across these movements.245 
Carolina’s criminal cases and claiming that “there are few, if any, states in the Union where 
they are more rapidly disposed of.”); Cameron, 81 S.E. at 752 (Allen, Walker, Brown, and 
Hoke, JJ., concurring) (discounting allegations of delayed justice); Joseph Edwin Proffit, 
Lynching: Its Cause and Cure, 7 YALE L.J. 264, 264–67 (1898) (criticizing the idea that 
expedient justice requires mob rule). Chief Justice Clark’s concerns about delay were not 
idiosyncratic; decades later, then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist also promoted court-
ordered executions as a bulwark against “anarchy . . . self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch 
law.” Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 961 (1981) (Rehnquist, J, dissenting from the 
denial of certiorari) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
240 VANN R. NEWKIRK, LYNCHING IN NORTH CAROLINA: A HISTORY, 1865–1941, app. 
II at 167–70 (2009). 
241 Raymond Gavins, The NAACP in North Carolina During the Age of Segregation, 
in NEW DIRECTIONS IN CIVIL RIGHTS STUDIES 105, 106–07 (Armstead L. Robinson & 
Patricia Sullivan eds., 1991) [hereinafter NEW DIRECTIONS]. 
242 See generally State v. Newsome, 143 S.E. 187 (N.C. 1928); JAMES ELBERT 
CUTLER, LYNCH-LAW: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE HISTORY OF LYNCHING IN THE UNITED 
STATES 264 (1905) (describing a coroner’s condoning of lynching as the act of “good 
citizens” defending their “homes, wives [and] daughters”). Much constitutional criminal 
procedure developed along the boundary between legal and extralegal violence, typically in 
racially charged cases with low-income defendants. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 
U.S. 278, 281–85, 287 (1936) (vacating black defendants’ capital murder convictions in the 
“so-called trial” after confessions were obtained through partial lynching and whippings); 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49–52, 72–73 (1932) (finding that the denial of counsel 
violated due process in one-day capital trials of black males charged with raping white 
women in the context of “tense, hostile and excited public sentiment”). 
243 See, e.g., KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 100–01. 
244 Id. at 17. 
245 See id. at 22; HERBERT J. LAHNE, THE COTTON MILL WORKER 233–34 (1944) 
(discussing the Communist-backed National Textile Workers Union making “no 
concessions to Southern prejudice on race”); Robert Korstad & Nelson Lichtenstein, 
Opportunities Found and Lost: Labor, Radicals, and the Early Civil Rights Movement, 75 
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But labor organizing hit the skids repeatedly in North Carolina. Milder union-
busting tactics in 1900 included owners closing mills, company stores, and housing 
to union members. Workers were blacklisted and their families left homeless, 
without “provisions [or] contact with the outside world, for the post office was in 
the company store.”246 In 1929, strikes were crushed in violent melees that led to 
criminal convictions of union workers and nolle prosequi decisions or acquittals 
for those accused of attacking or killing strikers.247 The latter group of defendants 
often comprised local sheriffs’ deputies or state National Guardsmen.248  
That antiunion fervor was formalized in 1947, as North Carolina pioneered 
“right to work” statutes that criminalized “closed shop” agreements between 
business and labor.249 In 1949, the U.S. Supreme Court gave those laws a 
constitutional stamp of approval.250 Thereafter the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations mounted an aggressive seven-year organizing campaign called 
“Operation Dixie”—but deliberately retreated from previously active recruitment 
across racial lines. Ultimately antiunion regulations, the segregated workforce, 
tensions between the black laboring and middle classes, and the real and imaginary 
links between unions and the Communist Party combined to hinder the 
development of organized labor in North Carolina.251 
The War on Poverty hit similar walls in the 1960s. As in the earlier 
Progressive and Fusion eras, there was some significant cooperation across color 
lines. Striking examples of such cooperation include the actions of Klan leaders 
Lloyd Jacobs and C.P. Ellis. Jacobs, an ex-convict, recruited NAACP members, 
student activists, and low-income people to join him in protesting prison 
conditions through an organization called the North Carolina Justice Committee.252 
Ellis was a vocal opponent of school integration, the civil rights movement, and 
War on Poverty efforts to aid blacks. He was astonished to be elected cochair of a 
community council responsible for creating a school desegregation plan—
particularly because he shared the role with black activist Ann Atwater. Until then, 
Ellis and Atwater had only “cussed each other, bawled each other, [and] hated each 
J. AM. HIST. 786, 788–93 (1988) (discussing union drive by black workers in Winston-
Salem). 
246 LAHNE, supra note 245, at 186–87. 
247 Id. at 216–21. 
248 Id. at 216–21, 227, 230–31. 
249 H.B. 229, 1947 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1947) (codified at N.C. GEN. 
STAT. §§ 95-78 to -84 (2011)).  
250 Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 527–29 nn.1–3, 
537 (1949) (affirming State v. Whitaker, 45 S.E.2d 860 (N.C. 1947)). 
251 KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 28–29, 168–69; see also LAHNE, supra 
note 245, at 216–21 (discussing violence against Communist-backed and non-Communist 
union workers and organizers); Risa Lauren Goluboff, “Let Economic Equality Take Care 
of Itself”: The NAACP, Labor Litigation, and the Making of Civil Rights in the 1940s, 52 
UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1422–27 (2005) (discussing the NAACP’s waxing and waning 
interests in the black labor movement); Korstad & Lichtenstein, supra note 245, at 801–06 
(discussing class tensions and the role of NAACP and Urban League in the rise and fall of 
union drive by black workers in Winston-Salem). 
252 KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 315–16. 
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other.”253 But when forced into a working relationship with Atwater, Ellis found “a 
whole world was opening up” and that he “was learning new truths that [he] had 
never learned before.”254 Among other things, he realized that structural 
disadvantages “shut out” low-income people of all races from economic and 
political opportunity.255  
But such interracial, intraclass cooperation remained rare and evanescent, as 
were attempts to fulfill demands for maximum feasible participation (MFP) by 
low-income people in designing and overseeing poverty-reduction programs. 
Congress incorporated MFP requirements into legislation such as the Economic 
Opportunity Act (EOA) and the Model Cities Act.256 The MFP mandate was 
modeled on the North Carolina Fund (the “Fund”). This novel approach to 
antipoverty advocacy was initially supported by state and national philanthropic 
foundations. Only later, after the EOA was crafted to follow the Fund’s model, did 
the Fund distribute federal dollars.257  
Professor Tara Melish focuses blame for the demise of the EOA’s MFP 
mandate—and for much of the antipathy toward the War on Poverty—on the 
“increasingly belligerent, extreme, and confrontational demands” of welfare rights 
activists for resource redistribution.258 Professors Robert R. Korstad and James L. 
Leloudis describe a more complex set of tensions at work in North Carolina. Their 
research shows that MFP drew consistent fire from the outset as white 
supremacists, farm and business owners, local governments, and nonprofits—with 
varied motives—resisted the mandate, finding it a direct challenge to their power 
and authority.259 
Such reactions, as well as the Fund’s deliberately limited time span, cabined 
antipoverty and racial justice work in North Carolina. The movements took another 
hit when new federal tax laws restricted philanthropic foundations from supporting 
work that could be construed as political (including education and organization 
involving voter registration drives) and made the restrictions enforceable through 
large monetary fines against not only the foundations but also their employees and 
board members.260 The triple whammy landed with elimination, reallocation, and 
privatization of governmental support programs for poor people in the 1990s.261 
Thus, even before the 2008 recession, North Carolina consistently ranked 
among the lowest ten states, near Texas and Mississippi, for per-pupil spending on 
253 Id. at 317. 
254 Id. at 317–18. 
255 Id. at 316–18. 
256 Id. at 166–67, 306, 340–41.  
257 Id. at 82–92, 166–67, 172–73. 
258 Tara J. Melish, Maximum Feasible Participation of the Poor: New Governance, 
New Accountability, and a 21st Century War on the Sources of Poverty, 13 YALE HUM. 
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 59–68 (2010). 
259 KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 172–73. 
260 Id. at 328–35. 
261 Id. at 252–53; see also Bach, Governance, supra note 92, at 243–50 (describing 
effects of 1996 federal welfare reform that limited welfare assistance, and discussing some 
responsive poverty-reduction efforts). 
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public education.262 Conversely, the state ranked sixteenth and fourteenth for 
highest overall and child-poverty rates, respectively, among the states.263 These 
rates spike in several urban and rural areas and are sharply skewed by race and 
ethnicity.264 For example, the median net worth of minority to white households in 
the state is fourteen cents on the dollar.265 To translate these numbers into the civil 
legal setting, approximately 80% of the low-income population that is eligible for 
and in need of legal services has no access to an attorney.266 The state ranks 
thirtieth in support for civil legal services; Florida invests twice as much and 
Maryland three times as much in services per eligible client.267 As another point of 
comparison, while there is one attorney for every 442 North Carolinians, the legal 
aid attorney-client ratio is one to 15,500.268 
In addition, conservative populism retains deep and vibrant roots in North 
Carolina. Recent developments are typical of national trends. In 2010, millions of 
dollars from inside and outside the state were targeted to seat the first Republican-
majority North Carolina General Assembly since Reconstruction.269 The state 
legislature promptly began to cut taxes and spending,270 and enacted what one 
expert called “the largest and most restrictive” cluster of voting regulations since 
passage of the federal Voting Rights Act fifty years ago.271 Those initiatives track 
262 Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PUBLIC EDUCATION FINANCES: 2008, at 8 tbl.8 
(2010) (showing only six states with less per-pupil spending), available at http://www2. 
census.gov/govs/school/08f33pub.pdf, with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PUBLIC EDUCATION 
FINANCES: 2010, at 8 tbl.8 (2012) (same), available at http://www2.census.gov/govs/school 
/10f33pub.pdf.  
263 GENE NICHOL & HEATHER HUNT, CTR. ON POVERTY, WORK, AND OPPORTUNITY, 
UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, DOCUMENTING POVERTY, ECONOMIC DISTRESS AND 
CHALLENGE IN NORTH CAROLINA: A REPORT FOR THE Z. SMITH REYNOLDS FOUNDATION 
11 (2010), available at http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/poverty/publications/documenti 
ngpoverty_finalreport.pdf. 
264 Id. at 11–14. 
265 Id. at 14. 
266 N.C. EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, INITIAL REPORT 8 (2008), available at 
http://www.ncequalaccesstojustice.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/fullsummitreport.pdf. 
267 Id. at 14. 
268 Id. at 22. 
269 See Final REDMAP Report, REDISTRICTING MAJORITY PROJECT (Dec. 21, 2010, 
2:54 AM), http://www.redistrictingmajorityproject.com/?p=638 (citing new “control” of 
state legislatures as the greatest partisan success “in modern history”); cf. Jane Mayer, State 
for Sale: A Conservative Multimillionaire Has Taken Control in North Carolina, NEW 
YORKER (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/10/10/111010fa_fact_ 
mayer (detailing strategies behind political victories in 2010 in North Carolina).  
270 See, e.g., Dan Kane, A New Loophole For Businesses Will Cost State $336 Million 
a Year, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER (June 3, 2012), http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/0 
6/03/2105416/a-new-loophole-for-businesses.html (finding that tax breaks for businesses 
equaled salaries and benefits for 6,400 laid-off state employees, including 900 teachers). 
271 Michael Gordon, Fight Over NC’s Voting Laws: Is it Race, or Is It Politics?, 
RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER (Oct. 19, 2013), available at http://www.newsobserver.com/2 
013/10/19/3296978/voting-fight-is-it-race-or-is.html (discussing complaint filed in United 
States v. State of North Carolina, No. 13-CV-861 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2013), available at 
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legal and political shifts occurring across the country.272 As discussed below, the 
initiatives include resurgent “tough on crime” rhetoric and legislation that threatens 
North Carolina’s improbable role as a criminal justice reform pioneer.  
 
IV.  REFORM, REACTION, AND RESILIENCE: AN UNLIKELY CONSTELLATION OF 
CUTTING-EDGE CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS 
 
North Carolina’s complex and often violent history makes the state a 
surprising site for cutting-edge criminal justice reforms, which this Part sorts into 
three categories. The first involves “innocentric” efforts to identify and reduce 
wrongful convictions. The second targets efficiency and cost reduction. These 
reforms are laudatory. Several directly redress power disparities that undermine 
system fairness, reliability, and legitimacy. But it is the third category of reform 
that more directly addresses the democracy deficit at the intersection of crime, 
race, and poverty. 
This category includes early intervention programs such as Nurse-Family 
Partnership (NFP) programs, which are designed at least in part to increase 
capacities for resilience and self-governance and to reduce criminal offending and 
victimization. Within the machinery of the criminal justice systems, two examples 
are North Carolina’s Indigent Defense Services system and the state’s Racial 
Justice Act. The former strengthens a defendant’s role and voice in case 
processing, and the latter vindicated the rights of black jurors to participate in 
capital cases. 
The foregoing categorization of North Carolina’s reforms is not hard and fast; 
motivations for these reforms overlap and vary. Their abilities to withstand 
reaction and repeal are also mixed.  
 
A.  Innocentric Reforms 
 
As indicated in the Introduction, the experiences of Inhofe and Stevens are 
linked to Thompson’s by a single factor: the need of an accused to access the 
prosecuting authority’s investigative file in order to mount a full and fair defense. 
Prior scholarship describes North Carolina’s pioneering full open-file discovery 
reform.273 That reform is a broadly democracy-enhancing tool. As Inhofe realized 
when “it happened to [him],”274 access to that information helps to level the 
playing field between a defendant and the concentrated power of a charging and 
prosecuting authority.  
Full open-file discovery cannot compensate for prosecutors’ superior 
investigative resources and ability to select the number and level of charges against 
a particular defendant. But access to the full investigative file can empower 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/ncm/news/2013/20130930_US_v_NC.pdf, which challenges 
voting restrictions imposed by, for example, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§163 to 166.13-14 (2013)). 
272 See WENDY WEISER & DIANA KASDAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, VOTING 
LAW CHANGES: ELECTION UPDATE 2–3 (2012), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/legacy/publications/Voting_Law_Changes_Election_Update.pdf. 
273 See Moore, supra note 13, at 1371–86. 
274 Lowy, supra note 1. 
 
                                                     
2014] DEMOCRACY ENHANCEMENT 587 
defendants to exercise a greater level of autonomy. A defendant’s decision to enter 
a plea or exercise the right to trial is more likely to be fully informed and voluntary 
when the defendant knows the strengths and weaknesses of the state’s case. In the 
minority of cases that go to trial, full open-file discovery helps to ensure that the 
defendant’s voice is heard through the full and fair airing of the evidence. Fact 
finders, who speak for the community either as elected judges in bench trials or as 
jurors exercising a quintessentially democratic check on concentrated government 
power, are likewise more fully able to undertake deliberations with confidence and 
issue reliable judgments. Thus, discovery reform enhances democracy while 
simultaneously promoting efficiency and finality of case processing and 
verdicts.275 
Full open-file discovery also spun off additional pioneering reforms in North 
Carolina. Newly opened prosecution files revealed still more wrongful convictions 
in a number of high-profile cases.276 Two types of responsive innocentric reforms 
bolstered full open-file mandates by seeking to prevent erroneous convictions. 
First, the state pioneered the creation of an independent Innocence Inquiry 
Commission to investigate and correct wrongful convictions.277 Second, North 
Carolina joined the minority of states undertaking reform of forensic investigation 
procedures. 
 
1.  The Innocence Commission 
 
North Carolina’s Innocence Inquiry Commission (IIC) is the only state 
agency in the country with the authority to refer prisoners with colorable innocence 
claims to court for potential exoneration and release.278 As was the case with 
mandatory statewide full open-file discovery reform, implementation of the new 
IIC statutes led to another spate of high-profile exonerations.279 
There also was predictable pushback. Prosecutors unsuccessfully sought to 
bar IIC claims by prisoners who plead guilty or no contest, to restrict sources of 
IIC referrals, to expand prosecutors’ adversarial participation in IIC proceedings, 
and to trim witness immunity protections.280 The legislature rejected these 
275 See Moore, supra note 13, at 1371–72, 1377. 
276 Id. at 1379 & n.360. 
277 North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1460 
to -1475 (2011); see also Robert J. Norris et al., “Than That One Innocent Suffer”: 
Evaluating State Safeguards Against Wrongful Convictions, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1301, 1355 
tbl.5 (2011) (listing jurisdictions with innocence commissions and their dates of 
establishment). 
278 Samuel Wiseman, Innocence After Death, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 687, 734 
(2010). 
279 David Wolitz, Innocence Commissions and the Future of Post-Conviction Review, 
52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1027, 1049–53 (2010). The Commission received more than 1,300 claims 
from its inception in 2007 through April 2013 and closed 1,113 cases, leading to the release 
of four prisoners based on clear and convincing evidence of innocence. See NC Innocence 
Inquiry Commission Case Statistics, N.C. INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMM’N, http://www.innoc 
encecommission-nc.gov/stats.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2014). 
280 H.B. 778, §§ 1–4, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011) (as referred to 
Judiciary Subcomm. B, Apr. 7, 2011), available at http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2011/Bil 
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proposals, but agreed to eliminate the IIC’s discretion to exclude from its 
proceedings any crime victim whose presence “may interfere with the 
investigation[.]”281 The legislature also restricted state compensation to IIC-
exonerated prisoners who plead not guilty or no contest.282  
Theoretically, these amendments marginally enhance individual voices vis-à-
vis concentrated authority. Their practical effect is open to question. The first 
amendment helps to guarantee victims a place at the table. Increased transparency 
improves procedural justice. New information can change victims’ perceptions 
about defendants’ guilt.283 But victims who are not called as witnesses or otherwise 
engaged by the IIC’s investigation and review process may be frustrated by the 
real or perceived inability to shape the outcome. This limitation is driven by the 
uniquely nonadversarial structure of the IIC’s investigative and first-tier decision-
making processes.284 
With respect to the second amendment, some defendants might strengthen 
either a pretrial innocence claim or plea bargaining position by pointing to the 
compensation exclusion as warranting concessions from the prosecution. But given 
the institutional pressures facing charged defendants,285 including pressures on 
overloaded defense attorneys,286 it is unlikely that many defendants will know that 
this exclusion is an automatic collateral consequence of any guilty plea. It is more 
likely that the exclusion will operate as intended: as completely barring 
compensation for anyone who pleads guilty but whom the IIC reveals to be a 
victim of wrongful imprisonment. Thus, the amendment exacerbates the power 





ls/House/PDF/H778v1.pdf. The original statute allowed adversarial hearings before a 
three-judge panel in the multitiered process. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1469(c–d) (2011). The 
proposed amendment would have expanded that authority to earlier stages in the process. 
H.B. 778, § 3, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011). 
281 H.B. 778, § 6, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011) (codified at N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 15A-1468(b) (2011)); cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1467(c) (2011) (“If a formal 
inquiry regarding a claim of factual innocence is granted, the Director shall use all due 
diligence to notify the victim in the case and explain the inquiry process. The Commission 
shall give the victim notice that the victim has the right to present his or her views and 
concerns throughout the Commission’s investigation.”). 
282 H.B. 778, § 11 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011) (codified at N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 148-82(b) (2011)). It is unclear whether this amendment trumps the eligibility of 
any wrongfully imprisoned individual to seek state compensation after obtaining a 
gubernatorial pardon of innocence. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-82(a) (2013). 
283 See generally JENNIFER THOMPSON-CANNINO ET AL., PICKING COTTON: OUR 
MEMOIR OF INJUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (2009) (discussing the experiences of a rape 
victim and the defendant, who was wrongfully convicted because of the victim’s mistaken 
eyewitness identification, but later exonerated). 
284 See Wolitz, supra note 279, at 1051–52. 
285 See Bibas, supra note 70, at 960–62. 
286 Moore, supra note 13, at 1026, 1058–62. 
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2.  Forensic Science Reforms 
 
Mounting evidence of wrongful convictions and exonerations also led the 
General Assembly to mandate improvements in eyewitness identification 
procedures that have been cited as the nation’s “most comprehensive.”287 
Addressing other predictable sources of error, the state mandated recordation of 
interrogations in felony cases,288 along with the preservation of biological evidence 
for future testing.289  
In 2011, North Carolina also joined a minority of states in reforming 
procedures governing its forensic science laboratory.290 This reform followed a 
chilling indictment of national forensic capabilities by the National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS), which stated that 
 
the existing legal regime—including the rules governing the 
admissibility of forensic evidence, the applicable standards governing 
appellate review of trial court decisions, the limitations of the adversary 
process, and judges and lawyers who often lack the scientific expertise 
necessary to comprehend and evaluate forensic evidence—is inadequate 
to the task of curing the documented ills of the forensic science 
disciplines.291 
 
In addition to the NAS critique, North Carolina’s Innocence Commission 
proceedings and other litigation revealed flaws in the qualifications, evaluations, 
and testimony of State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) forensic sciences staff. 
Among other things, previously unknown records demonstrated that SBI 
employees had provided biased or false testimony favoring the prosecution.292  
Responsive legislation created an independent state-oversight authority and 
specified qualification and evaluation standards to increase transparency and 
accountability.293 The full open-file discovery statutes were amended to 
specifically require disclosure not only of forensic test results but also of all 
underlying or preliminary notes and results.294 Legislators also created the position 
of forensic science ombudsman, tasked to work with all stakeholders including 
“the general public to ensure all processes, procedures, practices, and protocols at 
the State Crime Laboratory are consistent with State and federal law, best forensic 
law practices, and in the best interests of justice in this State.”295 
287 Norris et al., supra note 277, at 1318.  
288 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-211 (2011); see also Norris et al., supra note 277, at 1330–
41 (discussing varying recordation requirements in the nineteen states that regulate 
interrogation). 
289 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-268 (2011). 
290 Id. § 114-16.1. 
291 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC 
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 85 (2009). 
292 Norris et al., supra note 277, at 1321–22. 
293 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-16.1 (2011). 
294 Id. § 15A-903(a)(1)(a) (2011). 
295 Id. § 114-16.2. The state Indigent Defense Services agency also created a Forensic 
Resource Counsel position to help defenders “understand[] and . . . challeng[e] the forensic 
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Despite demonstrated and systemic flaws in the SBI’s forensic analysis 
department, North Carolina did not follow other states in creating an independent 
watchdog.296 Instead, after passage of this reform legislation, a retired judge was 
appointed to clean house at the SBI lab.297 An outside auditor tested all forensic 
workers for whom accreditation methods existed to determine their competence.298 
A number failed those tests.299 
Significantly, prosecutors recognized this news as impeachment information, 
which they had a duty to provide to the defense under Brady and the state’s full 
open-file discovery statutes. To the astonishment of many, the former judge in 
charge of the SBI’s reformation refused to give prosecutors the test results of 
individual forensic examiners.300 Instead of complying with Brady, the judge 
insisted that the information was protected by a personnel records exception.301 
The prosecutors subpoenaed the information, and the SBI was forced to reveal 
it.302 
That remarkable turn in North Carolina’s innocentric reforms may illustrate 
the long-term power of litigation and legislation to change the internal culture of 
prosecutorial offices.303 These reforms also enhance democracy at the most 
granular level. They check government power, reduce opportunities for intentional 
and unintentional biasing of investigations toward the prosecution, and help level 
the playing field for an individual who is subject to a charge or investigation.  
science evidence” by providing a database of information about forensic experts as well as 
training programs, research updates, and “other resources to support litigation.” See 
Forensic Resources, N.C. INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVS., http://www.ncids.com/forensic/ (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2014).  
296 See Norris et al., supra note 277, at 1321–27, 1327 tbl.2; cf. Kami Chavis 
Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the Federal 
Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 531–33 
(2008) (citing Cincinnati’s collaborative agreement as a model for participatory 
governance, oversight, and reform of policing). 
297 North Carolina Department of Justice, Permanent Director Named for State Crime 
Lab (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.ncdoj.gov/getdoc/56afaa4b-24e2-4b7a-a10a-552e36a92e13 
/Permanent-director-named-for-State-Crime-Lab.aspx; Mandy Locke & Joseph Neff, SBI 
Fights District Attorneys’ Attempts to Learn About Failed Tests, RALEIGH NEWS & 
OBSERVER (June 14, 2012), http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/06/14/2137375/sbi-fights- 
district-attorneys.html. 
298 Locke & Neff, supra note 297. 
299 Id. 
300 Memorandum from Joseph John, Sr., on Forensic Scientist Certification to All 
Elected Dist. Attorneys and Staff 3 (June 13, 2012), available at http://www.ncids.com/for 
ensic/sbi/analyst_certification/2012-06-16_SBI_Memo.pdf [hereinafter June 13, 2012 
Memo]; Memorandum from Joseph John, Sr., on Forensic Scientist Certification to All 
Elected Dist. Attorneys and Staff (Jan. 13, 2012), available at http://www.ncids.com/forens 
ic/sbi/analyst_certification/2012-01-13_SBI_Memo.pdf [hereinafter January 13, 2012 
Memo]; Motion for Release of SBI Testing Information (June 12, 2012), available at http:// 
www.ncids.com/forensic/sbi/analyst_certification/2012-06-12_State’s_Motion.pdf. 
301 June 13, 2012 Memo, supra note 300; January 13, 2012 Memo, supra note 300. 
302 See, e.g., In re Matter of the North Carolina State Crime Lab, No. 12CRS0031, 
2012 WL 3062033, at *2–3 (June 14, 2012). 
303 See Moore, supra note 13, at 1333. 
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On the other hand, the wrongful conviction movement addresses only a tiny 
percentage of criminal cases.304 As discussed below, with respect to the majority of 
cases involving guilty defendants, North Carolina also was early in creating a 
sentencing commission now viewed as “the exemplar of smart political and 
rational reform.”305  
 
B.  Focusing on the Bottom Line 
 
1.  The Sentencing Commission and Justice Reinvestment 
 
North Carolina’s sentencing commission is viewed as a model in part because 
it has the largest and most diverse membership of any sentencing commission in 
the country, ensuring that “[v]irtually every conceivable interest is represented.”306 
But the commission was not exemplary solely because of its structure. It was the 
“linchpin” connecting penal politics with a fiscal bottom line.307 By fulfilling a 
legislative mandate to conduct impact analyses on pending legislation, the 
commission helped to reduce the state’s incarceration rate from the highest in the 
nation to near the national average.308  
As discussed in Part II.B.2, convergent interests around cost cutting carry 
reformers only so far. In the 1980s, North Carolina faced significant increases in 
prison and jail populations, with correspondingly grim budget implications.309 The 
commission did not stop North Carolina from riding the nationwide wave of 
budget-busting “three strikes” mandatory sentences.310 As a result, North Carolina 
became one of seventeen states to participate in the Council of State Governments’ 
Justice Reinvestment initiative—again with predictably mixed results. 
The original vision of justice reinvestment entailed redirection of money spent 
on criminal cases and incarceration to rebuild “the schools, healthcare facilities, 
parks, and public spaces [] of neighborhoods devastated by high levels of 
304 Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1552–56 (2008). 
305 Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 782–83 (2005).  
306 Id. at 783.  
307 GOTTSCHALK, supra note 59, at 243; see also Wright, Counting the Cost, supra 
note 80. 
308 Wright, Counting the Cost, supra note 80, at 39. A recent law review article 
argued for fiscal impact statements but did not mention North Carolina’s exemplary role 
among jurisdictions that have required such analyses for years. See Mary D. Fan, Beyond 
Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L. REV. 581, 646–48 
(2012) (citing the United Kingdom as exemplar).  
309 On the contribution of the “nothing works” movement to increased incarceration 
rates and longer sentences, see, for example, Craig Haney, Demonizing the “Enemy”: The 
Role of “Science” in Declaring the “War on Prisoners,” 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 185, 204–
14 (2010); Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Application of Principles of 
Evidence-Based Practice to State Sentencing Practice and Policy, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 585, 
593–96 (2009). 
310 See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30–31 (2003) (approving 
constitutionality of three-strikes sentencing); Robert Ward Shaw, Comment, The States, 
Balanced Budgets, and Fundamental Shifts in Federalism, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1195, 1205–06 
(2004).  
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incarceration.”311 But consistent with this grasstops-driven initiative in other states, 
North Carolina’s reinvestment focused instead on expanding surveillance and 
control of released prisoners through increased probation and parole oversight—
albeit with “evidence-based” risk assessment protocols driving the categorization 
of people and programming.312 
 
2.  Collateral Consequences 
 
North Carolina is also one of a handful of states to tackle the jungle of 
collateral consequences that block access to the jobs, housing, education, and 
transportation that released prisoners need to reintegrate successfully into their 
communities.313 But the state has yet to follow the lead of other jurisdictions by 
eliminating collateral consequences outright or “banning the box” to limit potential 
employers’ access to applicants’ criminal histories.314 
Instead, North Carolina joined the very small group of states that grant 
certificates of rehabilitation to people with convictions who meet specified criteria 
that predict successful reentry.315 The corresponding state law also has been cited 
as a national model for limiting civil liability for employers who hire people with 
criminal records, should that hiring decision cause future harm.316 Both of these 
mechanisms are viewed as reducing barriers to employment. Finally, the state is 
one of only two in the country to have constructed a collateral consequences 
database through which defendants and complaining witnesses as well as 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges can become fully aware of the collateral 
costs and benefits of specific charges, plea offers, and sentences.317 
311 Nkechi Taifa & Catherine Beane, Integrative Solutions to Interrelated Issues: A 
Multidisciplinary Look Behind the Cycle of Incarceration, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 283, 
298 (2009). 
312 Nancy LaVigne et al., Justice Reinvestment Initiative State Assessment Report, 
URBAN INST. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 46 (2013) (documenting North Carolina’s nearly 
quintupled investment in probation and parole resources relative to treatment). N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 15A-1343.2 (Supp. 2012); see also North Carolina Overview, JUSTICE CTR., 
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, http://csgjusticecenter.org/jr/nc/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2014) 
(describing how the Council of State Governments Justice Center worked with North 
Carolina to develop the Justice Reinvestment Act of 2011); cf. Fan, supra note 308, at 633–
34 (disclaiming “starry-eyed and egalitarian hope for reclamation of every soul” in favor of 
“data-driven,” cost-effective, and “culturally conscious” selection of participants and 
programs). 
313 Joy Radice, Administering Justice: Removing Statutory Barriers to Reentry, 83 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 715, 717–20, 724 (2012) (highlighting barriers and citing authorities). 
314 See State Reforms Reducing Collateral Consequences for People with Criminal 
Records: 2011–12 Legislative Round-Up, LEGISLATIVE UPDATE (ACLU/Crossroad Bible 
Inst./Sentencing Project, Nat’l Employment Law Project), Sept. 2012, at 2, available at htt 
p://www.nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/2012/StateCollateralConsequencesLegislativeRoundupSept 
2012.pdf?nocdn=1 [hereinafter Reducing Collateral Consequences]. 
315 Radice, supra note 313, at 723–24. 
316 Reducing Collateral Consequences, supra note 314, at 6 (discussing N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 15A-173.5 (2011)). 
317 See Joel M. Schumm, Padilla and the Future of the Defense Function, 39 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3, 3–4, 13 (2011). For Ohio’s collateral consequences database, see 
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C.  Class, Race, and Reform: NFP, IDS, and RJA 
 
1.  Human Beings and Citizens: Isomoiria and Democracy Enhancement  
 
The foregoing constellation of reforms addresses the mechanics of criminal 
justice systems as traditionally conceived. A democracy-enhancing theory of 
criminal law and procedure should address causal factors driving the 
disproportionate representation of low-income and minority individuals in criminal 
justice systems—whether as crime victims, offenders, or, as is too often the case, 
individuals with dual victim/offender identities. Bannister traces the cradle-to-
prison pipeline that disproportionately funnels low-income African American 
children, particularly boys, from low literacy levels in racially and 
socioeconomically segregated early elementary school settings to dropping out in 
middle or early high school, then into juvenile systems and on to contact with 
criminal law and procedure as adults.318 
Nobel Prize-winning economist and law professor James Heckman reports 
that early intervention programs divert those pipelines by empowering families to 
improve their own prenatal care, parenting and communication skills, health and 
nutrition, and literacy.319 Available data indicate that these programs reduce the 
risk of offending while conserving increasingly scarce tax dollars.320 Conversely, 
Civil Impacts of Criminal Convictions Under Ohio Law, CIVICC OHIO.ORG, http://opd.ohi 
o.gov/civicc (last visited Apr. 3, 2014). 
318 See United States v. Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d 617, 628–45, 670–88 (E.D.N.Y. 
2011); see also Hinds Cnty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trs. v. R.B. ex rel. D.L.B., 10 So. 3d 387, 
411–12 (Miss. 2008) (Graves, J., dissenting) (discussing the “school-to-prison pipeline” 
resulting from overzealous punishment of school-aged youth). For examples of the 
abundant “pipeline” literature, see Michael Rocque & Raymond Paternoster, 
Understanding the Antecedents of the “School-To-Jail” Link: The Relationship Between 
Race and School Discipline, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 633, 634–38, 662–67 (2011) 
(summarizing varying causal explanations for the pipeline and arguing that regression 
analysis reveals the causal role of racial bias in school disciplinary decision making); 
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to 
Move Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253, 1338 n.255 (2011) (listing sources of pipeline data 
and analysis). 
319 Cf. James J. Heckman, Skill Formation and the Economics of Investing in 
Disadvantaged Children, SCI., June 30, 2006, at 1900–01 (arguing for skills acquisition as 
a priority for disadvantaged children). But see Holzer, supra note 85, at 15–20 (challenging 
Heckman’s “nothing works” critique of investing in adult human capital formation and 
emphasis on triaging scarce resources by diverting investments to early childhood 
development); Alan B. Krueger, Inequality, Too Much of a Good Thing, in JAMES J. 
HECKMAN & ALAN B. KRUEGER, INEQUALITY IN AMERICA: WHAT ROLE FOR HUMAN 
CAPITAL POLICIES? 1, 24–27, 60–61 (Benjamin M. Friedman ed., 2003) (critiquing 
exclusive focus on early intervention). 
320 Flavio Cunha et. al., Interpreting the Evidence on Life Cycle Skill Formation, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 697, 756 (Eric A. Hanushek & Finis Welch 
eds., 2006); Mark Soler et al., Juvenile Justice: Lessons for a New Era, 16 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 483, 489–92 (2009) (describing metastudy analyses).  
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popular programs like D.A.R.E. (Drug Abuse Resistance Education) and Scared 
Straight appear to have no effect or may even cause harm.321  
Heckman describes successful early intervention as investment in human 
capital. Those initiatives are as readily viewed as enhancing individual and 
community self-governance.322 The related empirical data hold promise for a 
democracy-enhancing approach to criminal law and procedure. Democracy 
enhancement at those levels can reduce the risk of criminal justice involvement 
before the mill begins its crushing cycle of offense and victimization, arrest, 
charge, conviction, incarceration, reentry, and recidivism.323  
As Professor Heckman explains, “Skill formation is a life cycle process. It 
starts in the womb and goes on throughout life. . . . [T]he traditional debate about 
nature versus nurture is scientifically obsolete.”324 When these capacities develop 
early on, they simultaneously “raise[] skill attainment at later stages” and 
“facilitate[] the productivity of later investment.”325 The mutually reinforcing 
relationship of these capacities frees early investment in human development of 
any “equity-efficiency trade-off.”326 
A number of early-intervention programs have been tested over time in terms 
of their payoff in reducing the risk of criminal justice involvement.327 One top-
performing example is the Nurse-Family Partnership (NFP).328 The program pairs 
a registered nurse with low-income, first-time mothers during pregnancy and for 
the first two years of the baby’s life.329 
321 Soler et al., supra note 320, at 491–92. 
322 Cf. Anne C. Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 IOWA L. REV. 431, 433–34 (2006) 
(arguing for constitutional recognition that early caregiving is “essential to the 
development of those psychological capacities that are necessary to the maintenance and 
flourishing of our modern democratic polity”). 
323 See Forman, supra note 60, at 52 n.118 (arguing that “the state frequently 
squanders opportunities to intervene before adolescents become murderers”). Forman 
promotes improved educational opportunities, programs, and services for incarcerated 
youth and adults. Id. at n.119. 
324 Cunha et al., supra note 320, at 698. 
325 Id.  
326 Id.  
327 Id.; see also Philip J. Cook et al., School Crime Control and Prevention, 39 CRIME 
& JUST. 313, 317, 377, 391 (2010) (“[T]his field is burdened by a lack of timely policy 
research and a tendency to launch major initiatives without first (or ever!) doing a high-
quality evaluation.”); Soler, supra note 320, at 489–91 (describing testing methodology and 
results of Colorado’s Blueprints for Violence Prevention initiative). 
328 Soler, supra note 320, at 490; see also SHARON MIHALIC ET AL., OFFICE OF 
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BLUEPRINTS 
FOR VIOLENCE PREVENTION 1–20 (2004) (delineating criteria for selecting effective 
programing), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/204274.pdf. Other highly 
effective model programs that are more resource intensive than the Nurse-Family 
Partnerships include Functional Family Therapy, Multisystemic Therapy, and 
Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care. Id. at 26–28. 
329 David L. Olds et al., Taking Preventive Intervention to Scale: Nurse-Family 
Partnerships, 10 COGNITIVE & BEH. PRAC. 278, 281–82 (2003). Further research is needed 
to determine the extent to which NFP’s commitment to voluntary and mutually respectful 
relationships between nurses and mothers prevents the degradation critiqued by Khiara M. 
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Economists at the RAND Corporation calculated that each dollar invested in 
NFP involvement with a high-risk family saves more than five dollars in social 
services, health care, and criminal justice expenditures.330 One might fruitfully 
compare the economic impact of early intervention and prevention with the cost of 
processing criminal cases—the bulk of which are low-level misdemeanors.331 
Accounting solely for personnel and physical-plant investments, an estimate from 
one jurisdiction concluded that flooding courtrooms with these cases is the 
criminal justice equivalent of swamping intensive care units with nosebleeds—at a 
cost to taxpayers of approximately $40,000 per hour.332 
North Carolina has promoted NFP in association with a twenty-year-old state 
legislative initiative called Smart Start.333 Established in 1993, Smart Start is a 
multipronged strategy to improve life outcomes by increasing low-income 
children’s preparation for kindergarten. “We want to develop their brains. We want 
them to start school healthy and ready to learn,” explained then-Governor Jim 
Hunt.334 Because NFP is an evidence-based model, fidelity to program design and 
structure is a prerequisite for accreditation. North Carolina was approved to begin 
an NFP program in one county in 2000 and has since expanded to 10 of the state’s 
100 counties.335  
That rate of expansion belies claims of social scientists that “the public is 
nearly universal in its support for early intervention—so much so that ‘child 
saving’ can be considered a core cultural belief.”336 Moreover, despite investing in 
early empowerment through Smart Start, and despite overall improving test scores, 
North Carolina still ranks fourth from the bottom among states for SAT scores.337 
The state also ranks second highest for teenage dropout rates.338  
Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 113, 122 n.27 
(2011). 
330 Lynn A. Karoly et al., Many Happy Returns: Early Childhood Programs Entail 
Costs, but the Paybacks Could Be Substantial, RAND REV., Fall 2005, at 10, 16–17. 
331 See generally ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL 
DEFENSE LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S 
BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS (2009), available at www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/Downloa 
dAsset.aspx?id=20808 (arguing that the “explosive growth” of misdemeanor cases results 
in underrepresented misdemeanants and high tax costs). 
332 ELI BRAUN, OHIO JUSTICE & POL’Y CTR., $42,000 FOR A COURTHOUSE HOUR: THE 
COST OF PROCESSING ADULT CRIMINAL CASES IN HAMILTON COUNTY OHIO 6 (2010), 
available at http://www.ohiojpc.org/text/publications/court%20cost.pdf.  
333 Hunt Back for Smart Start, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER (Mar. 22, 2011), http:// 
www.newsobserver.com/2011/03/22/1071553_hunt-back-for-smart-start.html. 
334 Id. 
335 M. Tina Markanda, North Carolina Nurse-Family Partnership: Evidence-Based 
Nurse Home Visitation Program and Health Care Reform, 71 N.C. MED. J. 302, 302–03 
(2010). 
336 Frances T. Cullen et al., Public Support for Early Intervention: Is Child Saving a 
“Habit of the Heart”? 2 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 109, 111 (2007). 
337 Tico A. Almeida, Refocusing School Finance Litigation on At-Risk Children: 
Leandro v. State of North Carolina, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 525, 528 (2004). 
338 Id. at 525, 527–28. 
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NFP designer David Olds also notes that the program grew during the 
economic boom years of the 1990s. He was prescient in predicting that continued 
support would be uncertain in harder times despite the fact that “it is during 
periods of economic stagnation and high unemployment that the program of this 
kind is needed most.”339 Smart Start has come under repeated attack in recent 
years, including cuts to its $300 million annual state funding. The 2008 economic 
crisis also did not spare the foundations that have supported North Carolina’s NFP 
programs from the outset.340 
 
2.  Indigent Defense Services 
 
The “basic facts” linking poverty with harm to healthy human development 
are “increasingly well known.”341 So too is the failure of “political will” in the 
United States “to invest in programs that work” and address the “moral scandal” of 
the highest child poverty rate in the Western industrialized world by bringing those 
rates in line with nations averaging “between one eighth and one half” that rate.342 
As these policy decisions feed predictable patterns of criminal victimization and 
offending, the public defender occupies a unique role in the struggle for expanded 
self-governance. This role’s “peculiar sacredness” derives from the duty to give 
voice to and vindicate the interests of the disproportionately low-income and 
minority individuals who face government prosecution.343  
Despite recent attacks on its independence, North Carolina’s Indigent Defense 
Services (IDS) system remains relatively well positioned to fulfill this role. The 
state enjoys one of the better-developed public defender programs in the country. 
Four components of the state’s Indigent Defense Act have been critical. The first 
three fulfilled the American Bar Association’s Ten Principles of a Public Defense 
Delivery System, widely acknowledged as establishing best practice standards for 
structuring indigent defense.344 
First, at the statutes’ inception, their express purpose prioritized quality of 
service and independence of counsel.345 Second, that independence was secured 
through system governance by a relatively broad-based commission that was not 
339 Olds et al., supra note 329, at 288. 
340 See Hunt Back for Smart Start, supra note 333 (describing 2011 budget 
negotiations and conservative criticism of Smart Start’s “wasting money” and “overpaid” 
leadership).  
341 J. Lawrence Aber et al., The Impact of Poverty on the Mental Health and 
Development of Very Young Children, in HANDBOOK OF INFANT MENTAL HEALTH 113, 113 
(Charles H. Zeanah, Jr., ed., 2d ed. 2000). 
342 Id. at 124–25. 
343 See Moore, supra note 151, at 1055–56 & n.126 (quoting Avery v. Alabama, 308 
U.S. 444, 447 (1940)). 
344 See AM. BAR ASS’N, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 2–
3 (2002), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_ai 
d_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf.  
345 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-498.1 (2011) (stating that the Act’s purpose is to “[e]nhance 
oversight” and “[i]mprove the quality . . . and . . . ensure the independence” of defense 
representation “in the most efficient and cost-effective manner without sacrificing quality 
representation”). 
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beholden to the executive, legislative, or judicial branches.346 Third, that 
commission was empowered to establish and enforce detailed, statewide standards 
for qualification, training, and performance for attorneys in all indigent defense 
practice areas ranging from termination of parental rights to death penalty cases.347  
Finally, and perhaps uniquely among jurisdictions in the United States, IDS 
has enjoyed relatively robust data collection, assessment, and research 
capacities.348 Reports have tracked per-case costs, identified avenues for improving 
efficiency without sacrificing quality of service, and highlighted opportunities to 
obtain more effective criminal justice policies.349 The IDS research division is the 
first in the nation to undertake broad-based, empirical examination of best practice 
standards for public defender training and performance.350 
IDS also enhances client service through listserv and other web-based training 
and communication networks. These resources create communities of knowledge 
and support among lawyers in various specialty areas.351 In addition to offering a 
rich intellectual, practical, and emotional resource for practitioners struggling with 
demanding caseloads, this communications network reciprocally helps IDS 
administrators respond to concerns of lawyers in the trenches. 
In terms of more traditional exercises of oppositional politics, the statewide 
IDS communications network also keeps the public defense bar alert and 
responsive to pending legislative changes—but apparently with diminishing effect. 
For example, recent cost-cutting and “tough on crime” legislation requires low-bid 
contracting of public defense services, and transferred ultimate responsibility for 
evaluating quality of contract service from IDS to elected local judges.352 The 
346 See id. § 7A-498.4. 
347 Id. §§ 7A-498.5 to .6. For the full guidelines, see IDS Standards and Performance 
Guidelines, N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVS., http://www.ncids.org/Attorney/Sta 
ndards_Guidelines.html?c=Information%20for%20Counsel,%20Standards%20And%20Per 
formance%20Guidelines (last visited Apr. 3, 2014). 
348 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-498.1 (2004) (stating the Act’s purpose includes 
“[g]enerat[ing] reliable statistical information in order to evaluate the services provided and 
funds expended”). 
349 See generally N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVS., NORTH CAROLINA’S 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A COMPARISON OF PROSECUTION AND INDIGENT DEFENSE 
RESOURCES (2011), available at http://www.ncids.org/Reports%20&%20Data/Latest%20 
Releases/ProsecutionOfIndigentDefense.pdf. 
350 MARGARET A. GRESSENS & DARRYL V. ATKINSON, N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT 
DEFENSE SERVS., THE CHALLENGE: EVALUATING INDIGENT DEFENSE—THE NORTH 
CAROLINA SYSTEMS EVALUATION PROJECT PERFORMANCE MEASURES GUIDE 4–6 (2012), 
available at http://www.ncids.org/Systems%20Evaluation%20Project/Projects/PM_Guide. 
pdf. IDS also appears to be pioneering the role of Forensic Resource Counsel to train and 
assist defenders in understanding and challenging forensic science evidence. See supra note 
295. 
351 About the IDS Commission and the IDS Office, N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE 
SERVS., http://www.ncids.org/about.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2014). 
352 Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2013, 2013 
N.C. Sess. Laws 360, §§ 18A.4, available at http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2013/Bills/Sen 
ate/PDF/S402v7.pdf (mandating contracts with private counsel who can provide “services 
more efficiently than current costs and ensure that the quality of representation is sufficient 
to meet applicable constitutional and statutory standards,” with provider selection based 
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General Assembly also politicized the appointment of regional chief defenders by 
transferring that authority from IDS to elected local judges as well.353 
As when prosecutors pushed proposals to weaken the state’s pioneering 
criminal discovery reform statutes,354 there was defense-led opposition to the 
amendment of these core IDS provisions. That opposition was ultimately thwarted, 
however. The legislature rejected amendments that would have maintained 
compliance with the ABA Ten Principles by requiring IDS to ensure that low-bid 
contracts provide quality representation and to retain authority over public 
defender appointments.355 
 
3.  The Racial Justice Act 
 
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, few of North Carolina’s cutting-
edge reforms attack the roots of the concentrated disadvantage and democracy 
deficit that mark the intersection of race, crime, and poverty.356 There are 
noteworthy exceptions, however. The president of the North Carolina Conference 
of District Attorneys has publicly “highlight[ed] a great social issue that has been 
years in the making and is bigger than any of us: race and justice and 
disproportionate minority contact with the criminal justice system.”357 Professors 
Marc Miller and Ronald Wright also note that the prosecutor in North Carolina’s 
largest city was one of a select few in the nation to participate in an internal self-
assessment designed to detect the influence of racial bias, whether implicit or 
conscious, in prosecutorial decision making.358 
In addition, Professors Mosteller, Grosso, and O’Brien have highlighted the 
state’s innovative Racial Justice Act (RJA). This legislation was the first in the 
nation to open meaningful avenues toward relief from capital prosecutions and 
solely on “cost-effectiveness” and with “[d]isputes regarding the ability of the potential 
contractor to provide effective representation . . . determined by the senior resident superior 
court judge for the district”).  
353 Id. at § 18A.5(a) (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-498.7(b)).  
354 See Moore, supra note 13, at 1341–44. 
355 The original bill required IDS to award contracts based solely on efficiency and 
cost effectiveness, and transferred authority from IDS to local judges both to resolve issues 
about quality and to appoint local public defenders. S.B. 402 §§ 18.A.4 to .5, 2013 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013), available at http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2013/Bills/Se 
nate/PDF/S402v2.pdf. Defense advocates initially stripped those provisions from the bill. 
S.B. 402, §§ 18.A.1–3, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013), available at http://ww 
w.ncleg.net/Sessions/2013/Bills/Senate/PDF/S402v4.pdf. Two days later, the contracting 
requirement was back, but with IDS retaining final contracting authority and required to 
consider quality of representation as well as efficiency and cost effectiveness. S.B. 402, 
§§ 18.A.4, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. (N.C. 2013), available at http://www.ncleg.net/ 
Sessions/2013/Bills/Senate/PDF/S402v5.pdf. That victory was partial and short lived, 
however. See supra notes 352–353. 
356 See Pratt & Cullen, supra note 38, at 378–79. 
357 Ben David, Community-Based Prosecution in North Carolina: An Inside-Out 
Approach to Public Service at the Courthouse, on the Street, and in the Classroom, 47 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 373, 375–76 (2012). 
358 Miller & Wright, supra note 80, at 162–63. 
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death sentences based on statistical evidence that race was a substantial factor in 
discretionary decision making by prosecutors and jurors.359 
As these scholars explain, the RJA moved significantly beyond the limited 
constitutional protections against race bias afforded to prospective jurors by Batson 
v. Kentucky360 and to capitally charged defendants under McClesky v. Kemp,361 in 
part by allowing defendants to prove the existence and effect of bias through 
statistical evidence.362 Thus, the RJA also expanded upon the only prior statutory 
model from Kentucky.363 Finally, the RJA was the first law of any kind to result in 
judicial findings, in State v. Robinson,364 that a death penalty system was infected 
by the intentional, statewide, race-based discrimination by prosecutors against 
African Americans in jury selection.365 
Two months after Robinson, the state legislature overrode a gubernatorial veto 
of amendments that gutted key RJA provisions.366 Nevertheless, the Robinson 
findings were reinforced by a second RJA order vacating three more death 
sentences under the amended statutes.367 The presiding judge again found that 
prosecutors had discriminated against prospective African American jurors on the 
basis of race.368 Such discrimination, the court held, “is at war with our basic 
concepts of a democratic society and representative government.”369 The court 
expressed hope that acknowledging “the ugly truth of race discrimination” in the 
selection of capital jurors would help to realize “our ideal of equal justice under the 
law.”370  
359 See North Carolina Racial Justice Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2010 to -2012 
(Supp. 2012). For an analysis of the legal and political history that led to the Racial Justice 
Act, see Kotch & Mosteller, supra note 193; Barbara O’Brien & Catherine M. Grosso, 
Confronting Race: How a Confluence of Social Movements Convinced North Carolina to 
Go Where the McCleskey Court Wouldn’t, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 463, 496–98. For 
analysis of the statute’s application, see Robert P. Mosteller, Responding to McCleskey 
and Batson: The North Carolina Racial Justice Act Confronts Racial Peremptory 
Challenges in Death Cases, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 103, 116–32 (2012).  
360 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  
361 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
362 Mosteller, supra note 359, at 107–16; O’Brien & Grosso, supra note 359, at 467–
76. 
363 See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Legislating Racial Fairness in Criminal Justice, 39 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 233, 238–44 (2007).  
364 State v. Robinson, No. 91-CRS-23143 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2012), available 
at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/marcus_robinson_order.pdf. 
365 Id. at 3, 70-71, 87-88, 95, 108, 160-67. 
366 An Act to Amend Death Penalty Procedure, S.B. 416, §§ 2–9, 2011 Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011) (enacted) (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-
2004(b), 15A-2011 to -2012). But see Mosteller, supra note 359, at 105–06 (describing 
amendments as “less sweeping” than vetoed revisions “but [still] quite significant”).  
367 State v. Golphin, Nos. 97 CRS 47314–15, 98 CRS 34832, 30544, & 01 CRS 
65079, at 2 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Dec. 13, 2012), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/rja 
_order_12-13-12.pdf. 
368 Id. at 5. 
369 Id. at 6 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979)). 
370 Id.; see also id. at 87–91 (discussing history of de jure and de facto exclusion of 
African Americans from jury service). 
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The RJA rulings constitute historic vindications of participatory democracy at 
the intersection of crime, race, and poverty. The rulings are noteworthy for other 
reasons as well. The court found, consistent with the first RJA order, that 
regression analysis revealed race-based disparate treatment of prospective jurors 
by prosecutors to be a significant factor in the imposition of the defendants’ death 
sentences.371 As required by the amended statute, the second RJA order was not 
based on statistical evidence alone.  
Instead, the second RJA order was “based primarily on the words and deeds 
of the prosecutors” constituting “powerful evidence of race consciousness and 
race-based decision making.”372 The prosecution provided what the court found to 
be the most compelling evidence of the prosecutors’ own intentional 
discrimination. 
One prosecutor undercut the State’s case by committing perjury during the 
RJA hearing itself.373 Other prosecutorial “words and deeds” included a “Top 
Gun” training program sponsored by the state Conference of District Attorneys, 
which promoted strategies to avoid Batson’s already weakly enforceable strictures 
against race-based peremptory strikes.374 Prosecutors also offered what the trial 
court found to be “patently irrational, nonsensical” justifications for striking 
African Americans from venires. These included prospective jurors’ military 
service, affiliation with the state government, and church attendance.375  
Yet another set of prosecutorial “words and deeds” brings this discussion full 
circle by linking the RJA litigation with North Carolina’s prior pioneering reform 
of full open-file discovery. These “words and deeds” comprised prosecutors’ notes, 
which documented the consideration of race in the exercise of jury strikes against 
African Americans. The notes were “long buried in the case files and brought to 
light for the first time” at the RJA hearing.376 They were not “brought to light” 
because prosecutors complied with the court’s RJA discovery order, which 
required the information’s disclosure to the defense. Instead, the information had 
been identified and preserved through a prior, independent defense investigation 
made possible by mandatory, statewide full open-file discovery statutes.377  
The RJA rulings are hardly the end of this particular democracy-enhancement 
story. They came at a cost to murder victims’ survivors who saw execution as just 
punishment despite the race-based elimination of prospective jurors.378 In April 
371 Id. at 136–201. 
372 Id. at 3, 112–20. 
373 Id. at 80. 
374 Id. at 4–5, 73–77. 
375 Id. at 121–24. 
376 Id. at 3; see also id. at 50 n.5 (stating that disappearance of prosecutor’s notes from 
file “could easily be construed to support the inference that the State intentionally 
destroyed [them]” but declining to so find due to sworn testimony by local judges 
regarding the prosecutor’s “excellent reputation for truthfulness and integrity”). 
377 See id. at 47, 50 & n.5 (discussing 2006 investigation of postconviction counsel); 
State v. Golphin, Nos. 97 CRS 47314–15, 98 CRS 34832, 30544, & 01 CRS 65079, at 60–
66 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Hearing Tp. Oct. 1, 2012) (discussing 2006 postconviction discovery 
procedure).  
378 See Angela Wright, Emotional Response to RJA Verdicts, CIVITAS REV. ONLINE 
(Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.civitasreview.com/miscellaneous/emotional-response-to-rja-ve 
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and October, 2013, respectively, the North Carolina Supreme Court granted the 
State’s petitions for discretionary review of the orders vacating the death sentences 
under the RJA.379 In June 2013, the RJA was repealed entirely and retroactively,380 
with the aim of speeding up state-sanctioned executions.381 
 
D.  Constellation Mapping and Circumspection 
 
To map the foregoing constellation of laws and policies in North Carolina is 
to reveal cycles of reform, reaction, retrenchment, and repeal that warrant 
considerable circumspection. Other states may achieve similar or better outcomes 
through other means. North Carolina also has failed to fully exploit all available 
reform opportunities. A salient example relates to the nationally publicized 
decision of Governor Beverly Perdue to issue pardons of innocence for a group of 
civil rights and antipoverty activists known as “The Wilmington Ten.”382  
Perdue issued the pardons just before leaving office in January 2013, but the 
cases arose forty years earlier. The defendants were convicted of firebombing a 
white-owned grocery store in North Carolina’s largest port city—the site of the 
infamous Wilmington Massacre during the white supremacy campaign of the 
1890s.383 The grocery store fire occurred amid protests over the closure of the local 
African American high school and dispersal of the black students to white 
schools.384 
The cases of the Wilmington Ten, like other cases that ultimately motivated 
North Carolina’s enactment of mandatory statewide full open-file criminal 
discovery,385 involved years of postconviction litigation and a federal appellate 
court vacating the convictions based on Brady violations.386 The Fourth Circuit 
reached the “inescapable” conclusion that the Wilmington Ten prosecutor knew his 
key witness committed perjury and suppressed the witness’s contradictory prior 
statement from the defense (along with other material exculpatory evidence).387 
Yet the taint of prior conviction and imprisonment still hung over the 
Wilmington Ten until Perdue issued the pardons of innocence. The governor’s 
signing statement cited the recantation of prior witnesses as a reason for issuing the 
rdicts/ (describing the departure from the courtroom of the widow of murdered highway 
patrol Sergeant Ed Lowry and uniformed officers, who had filled “over three-fourths of the 
courtroom,” as the judge read the order entitling the defendants to reduced sentences). 
379 State v. Augustine, 748 S.E.2d 318 (N.C. 2013); State v. Robinson, 366 N.C. 558 
(2013). The author filed Brief for North Carolina Citizens Excluded From Jury Service 
Based on Race as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellee, Robinson, 366 N.C. 558 
(No. 411A94-5). 
380 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 154, § 5(a)–(d). 
381 Id. §§ 1–4. 
382 See, e.g., Valerie Bauerlein, Full Pardon in ‘Wilmington 10’ Case, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 1, 2013, 7:31 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873233204045782 
16040822458954.html (subscription required).  
383 See supra Part III.B. 
384 Chavis v. North Carolina, 637 F.2d 213, 215–16 (4th Cir. 1980). 
385 See Moore, supra note 13, at 1377–79. 
386 Chavis, 637 F.2d at 223–24. 
387 Id. 
 
                                                     
602 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
pardons. But the signing statement also emphasized newly discovered evidence 
that the prosecutor relied on race in jury selection.388  
The governor decried the latter conduct as  
 
utterly incompatible with basic notions of fairness and with every ideal 
that North Carolina holds dear. The legitimacy of our criminal justice 
system hinges on it operating in a fair and equitable manner . . . not 
based on race or other forms of prejudice. . . . [T]hese convictions were 
tainted by naked racism and represent an ugly stain on North Carolina’s 
criminal justice system that cannot be allowed to stand any longer. 389 
 
Perdue was not alone in condemning the infection of criminal proceedings 
with racially biased juror exclusion. She was joined by Wilmington’s prosecutor—
the same man who, as president-elect of the state Conference of District Attorneys, 
publicly called for innovative responses to “a great social issue that has been years 
in the making and is bigger than any of us: race and justice.”390 The prosecutor was 
quoted as saying, 
 
When jurors are excluded from the judicial process on the basis of 
race . . . the defendant and the entire community are denied a fair 
trial. . . . Where, as here, the process that was in place to search for the 
truth is determined to be so fundamentally flawed that we cannot know 
it, the verdict cannot stand the test of time.391 
 
Such statements might have inspired hope that the RJA orders finding 
statewide infection of capital jury selection with comparable race bias would 
inspire gubernatorial disapprobation and even conversion of existing death 
sentences to RJA-mandated sentences of life imprisonment without parole. At 
minimum, such sentiments might have been expected to stem the tide toward the 
RJA’s repeal. Future research should explore the reasons why such aspirations 
were so completely thwarted. Some preliminary thoughts are offered here. 
First, the cases of the Wilmington Ten and the RJA litigants stood in a very 
different procedural posture. For the former, forty years of litigation and 
extrajudicial advocacy revealed the unfairness under settled federal constitutional 
law, and the factual wrongfulness, of the convictions and sentences. In contrast, 
when the governor issued the Wilmington Ten pardons, the ink was barely dry on 
the RJA amendments, orders, and petitions for appellate review—none of which 
388 The local newspaper published the full text of the governor’s signing statement, 
which was deleted from the gubernatorial website after Perdue left office. See Special to 
the Wilmington Journal from the Governor of the State of North Carolina, Governor 
Beverly Perdue, WILMINGTON J. (Jan. 1, 2013), http://wilmingtonjournal.com/gov-perdue-i 
ssues-pardon-of-innocence-for-wilmington-10/. 
389 Id. 
390 David, supra note 357, at 375–76. 
391 Anne Blythe, Perdue Pardons Wilmington 10, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Jan. 1, 
2013), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2012/12/31/3758600/perdue-pardons-wilmington 
-10.html (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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implicated any of the innocentric interests that garner (relatively) ready popular 
support. 
Second, as the foregoing analysis of North Carolina’s criminal justice reforms 
demonstrates, change is seldom insulated from reaction and repeal. It was precisely 
the effectiveness of the RJA’s direct, systemic assault on the infection of race bias 
in capital cases that proved to be the statute’s undoing. Other categorical 
interventions to halt executions have had mixed long-term results, including 
backlash against judicial, executive, and legislative decision makers and increased 
support for capital punishment.392 Put bluntly, the RJA jumped on the political 
third rail at the intersection of crime, race, and poverty. 
The foregoing analysis also makes clear that while several of North Carolina’s 
pioneering reforms resulted from litigation and legislation, none exemplifies direct 
input or leadership from the low-income and minority individuals who are 
disproportionately affected by crime and criminal justice systems. Certainly these 
reforms appear to level the playing field. One or two could be cast as 
fundamentally concerned with democracy enhancement. But with the exception of 
the Innocence Inquiry Commission and the RJA, support has been deeply rooted in 
arguments for efficiency—the wise stewardship of increasingly scarce tax dollars. 
One need not share Derrick Bell’s suspicion toward interest convergence, Matthew 
Adler’s critique of cost-benefit analysis, or Iris Marion Young’s commitment to 
democracy as fully participatory communicative action to seek a more sustainable 
theoretical grounding for criminal justice reform.  
Viewed through the lens of a democracy-enhancement theory discussed in 
Part II, therefore, North Carolina’s reforms present a decidedly mixed picture. The 
next Part digs below the surface to examine the state’s institutional culture in light 
of the outlines of a democracy-enhancement theory, probing for causal 
explanations behind the constellation of cutting-edge criminal justice reforms and 
their occasional resilience against reaction and repeal. To that end, Part V focuses 
particularly on the institutionalization of capacities for critical reflection and action 
through oppositional politics. 
 
V.  DEMOS, DELIBERATORS, AND DEFENDERS 
 
Mixed motives sparked North Carolina’s constellation of cutting-edge 
criminal justice reforms. Initiatives driven by concerns for fairness or involving 
significant resource redistribution—whether that redistribution targets economic, 
human, or social capital, including the prerogatives of white privilege—have been 
less resilient in the face of reaction and repeal than those with more immediately 
obvious cost-benefit payoffs. The search in this Part is for replicable conditions 
that promote sustainable reform, particularly conditions that enable jurisdictions to 
embed self-reflective capacities within processes for criminal justice policy 
making and implementation. 
392 See, e.g., Kelly Holthusen, How to Argue for Your Life in Fifteen Minutes or Less: 
An Analysis of Illinois Governor Ryan’s Clemency Review Boards, 30 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. 
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 105, 122–23 (2004) (discussing response to gubernatorial decisions); 
Gerald N. Rosenberg, Romancing the Court, 89 B.U. L. REV. 563, 574–77 (2009) 
(discussing response to U.S. Supreme Court rulings). 
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A.  Demos 
 
The historian V.O. Key, Jr. correctly noted that North Carolina’s then-nascent 
oppositional politics had the potential to grow from the ground up.393 The state’s 
geography is trifurcated between the Appalachian Mountains, the Piedmont, and 
the sea. In parallel fashion, economic interests were historically divided among a 
relatively small slave-owning plantation elite in the east, small farmers in the 
center of the state, and a historically poorer and more isolated mountain 
population. As discussed in Part III, the post-Reconstruction white supremacy 
campaigns, the violent imposition of one-party rule, and Jim Crow repression 
coincided with concentrating power in the tobacco and textile manufacturing 
industries, rapidly expanding banking interests, and the development of a small 
group of highly influential law firms. In Key’s description, from North Carolina’s 
inception, the state’s regional economic interests created “more-tender sectional 
sensibilities than any other state in the South . . . . ”394 
But most states can claim geographic, economic and political divisions that 
will be viewed as significant by the people who have to navigate them. Likewise, 
opposition between conservative, business-oriented factions and populist 
undercurrents is commonplace. A number of states also have greater racial and 
ethnic diversity than North Carolina. A recent spike in Latino immigration has 
reduced the non-Hispanic white population to 65% while the black population has 
remained fairly consistent at just under 25% of the population.395 
Nevertheless, both before and after the Red Shirt revolution, the African 
American population in North Carolina enjoyed strong, well-educated, business-
oriented, politically active leadership.396 During the Jim Crow era, blacks 
developed independent institutional structures in addition to business and 
schools—“churches, newspapers, fraternal lodges, and women’s clubs”—and 
hammered out new coalitions with partners inside and outside the state.397 Those 
resources provided a foundation for oppositional politics in the most recent Civil 
Rights era and beyond. Exemplary leaders include nationally renowned historian 
John Hope Franklin as well as leading civil rights attorneys such as Julius L. 
Chambers and James E. Ferguson II.398 As Professors O’Brien and Grosso explain, 
393 See KEY, supra note 177, at 218–28. 
394 Id. at 219. 
395 See KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 311; State and County QuickFacts: 
North Carolina, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (last revised Mar. 27, 2014), http://quickfacts.censu 
s.gov/qfd/states/37000.html. 
396 See, e.g., KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 81, 189–90 (discussing black 
leadership in Durham). 
397 ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK 
COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE 187–88 (1984). 
398 Patricia Sullivan, Southern Reformers, the New Deal, and the Movement’s 
Foundation, in NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 241, at 89 & n.19 (discussing John Hope 
Franklin); Douglas Martin, Julius Chambers, a Fighter for Civil Rights, Dies at 76, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/07/us/julius-chambers-a-fighter-fo 
r-civil-rights-dies-at-76.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (discussing Chambers’s leadership); 
see also Charles E. Daye, The Evolution of the Modern Law School: Crucial Trends That 
Bridge Past and Future, 73 N.C. L. REV. 675, 685 (1995) (describing Chambers’s role as a 
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such leadership energized similar coalition building that led to the near success of 
a legislative moratorium on executions and, in turn, to passage of the RJA.399 
 
B.  Deliberators 
 
Despite the state’s halting progress on education, there is at least one 
distinctive example of an “honest broker” deliberative function served by a public 
university in the context of criminal law and procedure. Professors at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s School of Government evaluate and 
interpret legislation and case law as part of their duties in training prosecutors, 
judges, and indigent defense attorneys from all corners of the state’s unified court 
system. Because institutions and individual actors are mutually constitutive,400 
leadership development is critical. Critiques of criminal justice systems, agencies, 
and agents often emphasize the powerful impact of institutional culture on 
stakeholders’ identity formation, including through the shaping of next-generation 
leadership (whether intentional or unintentional).401 It appears that relatively few 
states have similar evaluation, interpretation, training and research functions that 
are embedded in their local universities and focused on criminal law and 
procedure.402  
Foundations and nonprofits also provide some institutionally independent 
space to improve the quality of deliberation and decision making on issues of 
criminal law and procedure. As discussed in Part IV.A, Key and other scholars 
overstate the scope and direction of North Carolina’s progress on education.403 
There is bitter irony in the fact that one of the state’s leading white supremacists 
simultaneously oversaw the violent overthrow of elected Fusionist governments, 
the development of Jim Crow, and the biggest investment in the state’s history to 
improve public education for both black and white students. Significantly, it was 
investments from northern foundations that supported the white supremacist 
movement’s “school-building campaign of staggering proportions: during the 
period 1902–10, the state erected on average more than one new schoolhouse a 
day.”404 
civil rights leader and litigator of key cases in both school desegregation and employment 
discrimination); Lawyer Limelight: James E. Ferguson II, LAWDRAGON (Jan. 5, 2012) 
(interview with James Ferguson describing his civil rights advocacy), available at http:// 
www.lawdragon.com/lawyer-limelights/james-e-ferguson-ii/. 
399 O’Brien & Grosso, supra note 359, at 495–98. 
400 See Elizabeth S. Clemens & James M. Cook, Politics and Institutionalism: 
Explaining Durability and Change, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 441, 445−46 (1999). 
401 See, e.g., Miller & Wright, supra note 80, at 184−87. 
402 One corollary to North Carolina’s School of Government is the Washington State 
Institute for Public Policy. See generally STEVE AOS ET AL., WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. 
POL’Y, EVIDENCE-BASED PUBLIC POLICY OPTIONS TO REDUCE FUTURE PRISON 
CONSTRUCTION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE COSTS, AND CRIME RATES (2006). 
403 See KEY, supra note 177, at 208–09 (emphasizing educational advances under 
white supremacist rule). But see supra notes 222, 262 and accompanying text. 
404 At the same time, per-pupil funding for black and white students dropped from 
parity to thirty cents on the dollar. KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 59; see also J. 
Morgan Kousser, Progressivism—For Middle-Class Whites Only: North Carolina 
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Foundations and nonprofits also help expand opportunities and capacities for 
oppositional politics at the intersection of crime, race, and poverty. Like other 
states, North Carolina has a long history of such public-private partnerships. In the 
antebellum, Reconstruction, and Jim Crow eras, black leaders tapped northern 
philanthropists and mission societies to build educational and business 
infrastructure.405 As noted above, a white supremacist governor used foundation 
funds to support a school-building campaign in the first part of the twentieth 
century. In the early 1960s, then-Governor Terry Sanford obtained funding from 
the Ford Foundation, as well as North Carolina’s Z. Smith Reynolds and Mary 
Reynolds Babcock foundations, for a homegrown War on Poverty.406 The resulting 
North Carolina Fund became a model for the federal War on Poverty, particularly 
in emphasizing maximum feasible participation by low-income and minority 
individuals and communities in program development, implementation, and 
oversight.407  
As discussed in Part III, the Fund saw limited success, but African American 
leadership (both grassroots and elite) was critical to the Fund’s creation and 
accomplishments.408 Local philanthropists have continued to support research on 
the concentrated disadvantage that exists at the intersection of crime, race, and 
poverty. For example, the Z. Smith Reynolds Foundation recently provided 
support to the School of Government to create the state’s pioneering web-
searchable collateral consequences database.409 In the wake of negative reaction by 
prosecutors and the public to litigation under the RJA, the Fund also supports the 
development of training materials for justice system personnel on detecting and 
eliminating racial bias from criminal proceedings.410 
 
C.  Defenders 
 
Such training may be one of the most important factors in achieving reform 
that is sustainable over the long term. This is particularly true when training is 
directed through a statewide indigent defense services system411 that is bolstered 
by collaboration between the criminal defense and plaintiffs’ bars to obtain 
Education, 1880–1910, 46 J.S. HIST. 169, 189−90 (1980) (contesting the definition of 
“progress” in early twentieth-century educational funding, saying that “[i]ncreasing 
inequality in services . . . inevitably spawned increasing inequality in income and wealth—
a peculiar definition of progress”). 
405 KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 59. 
406 Aidan Smith, This Month in North Carolina History: July 1963—The North 
Carolina Fund, UNIV. OF N.C. (July 2005), http://www2.lib.unc.edu/ncc/ref/nchistory/jul20 
05/. 
407 KORSTAD & LELOUDIS, supra note 188, at 59–66, 79–82. 
408 See id. at 81–82. 
409 See The Collateral Consequences Assessment Tool (C-CAT), UNIV. OF N.C. SCH. 
OF GOV’T, http://www.sog.unc.edu/node/2582 (last visited Apr. 3, 2014). 
410Alyson Grine, Race Manual Underway, N.C. PUB. DEFENDER (Univ. of N.C. Sch. 
of Gov’t, Chapel Hill, N.C.), Aug. 2012, at 3. 
411 See supra Part IV.C.2. 
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adequate resources and drive policy change.412 Other free-standing, defense-
oriented institutions such as the Center for Death Penalty Litigation also make 
major contributions to strengthening oppositional politics in the context of criminal 
law and procedure.413 
It is perhaps this combination of factors that distinguishes North Carolina 
from other jurisdictions. To be sure, other jurisdictions have unified defender 
systems,414 excellent defender training programs,415 and partnerships between the 
criminal defense and plaintiffs’ bars.416 But North Carolina appears to be a fairly 
rare example where these factors coincide. 
As noted in Part IV.C.2, other crucial components of effective indigent 
defense reform include the capacities to establish and enforce statewide standards 
for attorney qualification, performance, and workload; create and maintain 
statewide training and listserv programs that empower attorneys to meet those 
standards and demand the resources necessary to do so; and collect, assess, and use 
statewide data on outcomes in promoting system improvements. Access to data is 
enhanced where, as in North Carolina, the state has merged case processing into a 
statewide, unified court system. Although far from comprehensive, such data 
collection and assessment capacities are prerequisites to politically effective action 
based on fairness, transparency, accountability, and efficiency.417 
At the back end, statutes permit self-correction of indigent defense service 
failures by allowing investigation and litigation of postconviction motions 
involving ineffective assistance on direct appeal instead of being limited to local 
trial courts.418 North Carolina also has benefited from pockets of strong 
investigative reporting by major media outlets. Detailed analysis of wrongful 
convictions has played an especially critical role in expanding public awareness of 
412 See Wright, Parity, supra note 80, at 231–42 (describing successful state 
legislative efforts to balance prosecutorial and defense resources through parity 
assessment); see also Moore, supra note 13, at 1378−79 (describing the role of the defense 
bar in shaping legislative history of full open-file discovery). 
413 See O’Brien & Grosso, supra note 359, at 486–87. 
414 Colorado, Montana, and New Hampshire are examples. 
415 Kentucky’s Department of Public Advocacy, the Public Defender Services of 
Washington, D.C., and Colorado’s Public Defender system are examples. 
416 North Carolina Advocates for Justice and Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice 
are two organizations that join attorneys across practice areas. See generally ARIZ. 
ATTORNEYS FOR CRIM. JUST., http://www.aacj.org/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2014). 
417 See, e.g., Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. 
REV. 69, 94–98 (2011) (proposing mandatory disclosure of prosecution costs). 
418 See generally Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: 
Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679 (2007) 
(arguing for procedures allowing litigation on direct appeal of claims that trial counsel 
were constitutionally ineffective). But see N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1415(b)(3), 1415(c), 
1418, 1419(a)(1) (2011) (allowing appellate lawyers to litigate constitutional claims 
through postconviction motions filed on direct appeal, with no procedural bar to 
subsequent litigation of other constitutional claims post appeal, since 1977). 
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and receptivity to broader concerns about fairness and accountability in criminal 
proceedings.419  
 
D.  Diversity and Deep Analogies 
 
The foregoing discussion does not exhaust prerequisites for creating and 
sustaining oppositional politics in the context of criminal law and procedure. Nor 
are the highlighted institutional factors idiosyncratic to any single jurisdiction. 
Moreover, any circumstance that supports oppositional politics in the context of 
criminal law and procedure must be augmented with vision, opportunism, and 
tenacity. There also must be cracks in the mortar that open up wiggle room for 
“political entrepreneurs.”420 Another characteristic that helps to drive and sustain 
reform is diversity within institutions, as well as the embedding of institutions 
themselves in broader “networks that crosscut important . . . boundaries.”421 
Professors O’Brien and Grosso describe how networking across diversity occurred 
in movements leading to enactment of the RJA.422 
Successful articulation and implementation of new policies also may require 
“deep analogies to already institutionalized models or widely held norms.”423 On 
this point, North Carolina’s strikingly Janus-faced sociopolitical and legal histories 
serve as unlikely resources for the long-haul work of expanding democracy at the 
intersection of crime, race, and poverty. It may be that the state’s progressive self-
conception—a mythos inscribed in scholarship as early as Key’s Southern 
Politics—is itself an important catalyst. That mythology may moderate reaction 
and lower the activation energy required to initiate change. 
The state’s progressive sociopolitical subtext is discernible even in recent 
events. The May 2012 Klan rally outside Harmony, North Carolina, may have 
drawn more protesters than participants.424 In response to the pardon of the 
Wilmington Ten, due in part to the past prosecutor’s race-based discrimination 
during jury selection, the current prosecutor stated publicly that such conduct 
denies both defendants and the community a fair trial.425 In addition, “Moral 
Monday” protests against the recent conservative legislative agenda have drawn 
419 See, e.g., Joseph Neff, Time of Death, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER (Dec. 8, 
2002), available at http://web.campbell.edu/faculty/bartlett/Forensic%20Entomology/news 
observer_com%20%20Series1.htm (covering the wrongful conviction of death row inmate 
Alan Gell); Phoebe Zerwick, Special Report, Murder, Race, Justice: The State vs. Darryl 
Hunt, WINSTON-SALEM J., http://www.journalnow.com/app/specialreports/hunt/ (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2014). 
420 Clemens & Cook, supra note 400, at 453. 
421 Id.; see also id. at 460 (describing “multivocality—that fact that single actions can 
be interpreted coherently from multiple perspectives simultaneously” as a requirement for 
“robust action”). 
422 O’Brien & Grosso, supra note 359, at 476−82. 
423 Clemens & Cook, supra note 400, at 457. 
424 KKK Hold Rally, supra note 235. 
425 Blythe, supra note 391. 
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national attention, particularly as law professors and pastors join the hundreds of 
protesters who have been arrested.426 
These recent events reveal deep analogies to historic tensions between the 
state’s conservative and progressive movements. Innovation and stability are (often 
unhappily) wedded. That dialectical tension supports a cautious optimism about 
the degree to which institutional improvements, particularly those obtained through 
law, can equalize power disparities without co-opting “subordinate groups through 
symbolic displays leaving elite wealth, status, and power in society intact.”427  
The predictable cycle of action and reaction also grounds a healthy skepticism 
about the pace if not the overall trajectory of change. Since “mobilization from 
below begets counter-mobilization from above,”428 policy innovators must be 
prepared to augment regulation through litigation or legislation with sustained 
grassroots advocacy. Sometimes “technically savvy and ideologically committed 
representatives of the have-nots” must pull a laboring oar to navigate inevitable 
backlash.429 
In other words, it is not time to abandon ship. Litigation, legislation, and 
activism remain viable avenues toward improving lives and systems. Despite 
predictable reaction and setbacks, the unlikely constellation of pioneering criminal 
justice reforms in a single jurisdiction should inspire reform advocates to focus and 




The core question animating this work is a search for sustainable production 
of the conditions that allow jurisdictions to reduce the footprint of the carceral state 
and improve criminal justice systems through the traditional clash of law and 
politics as vitally necessary complements to internal agency reform. The analysis 
revealed several interesting characteristics of one reform jurisdiction. Vibrant 
oppositional politics incorporate relatively robust and proactive indigent defense 
functions. Diverse mechanisms institutionalize the collection, assessment, and 
strategic use of criminal justice data. Networking within and across institutions 
deepens capacities for effective action. 
Such conditions embed greater opportunities for meaningful self-reflection 
into discourse on criminal justice issues than can exist in jurisdictions lacking 
those capacities. Concededly, where such conditions promote opportunities for 
criminal justice reform, they tend to privilege grasstops over grassroots advocacy 
and might be dismissed—like Inhofe’s Pilot’s Bill of Rights—as still more 
426 See Anne Blythe, N.C. Lawmakers Go Home, But ‘Moral Monday’ Protesters Will 
Return, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER (July 28, 2013), http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/ 
07/28/3065359/moral-mondays-not-over-yet.html; N.Y. Times Editorial Bd., supra note 
172; Jedediah Purdy, Why I Got Arrested in Raleigh: The States Are the New Front Line, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 11, 2013, 8:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jedediah-pur 
dy/why-i-got-arrested-in-ral_b_3420683.html. 
427 Robin Stryker, Half Empty, Half Full, or Neither: Law, Inequality, and Social 
Change in Capitalist Democracies, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 69, 72 (2007). 
428 Id. at 87. 
429 Id. at 88. 
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superfluous examples of “them as has, gets.” Nor are these movements immune 
from predictable backlash. Nevertheless, engaged scholarship may enhance 
attempts to wrest greater transparency and accountability from concentrated 
government power—including attempts like Inhofe’s—by expanding avenues 
toward broader democratic and productive demands for reform.  
One focus for such additional research is analysis of effective activism by 
those most directly affected by crime and criminal justice systems—poor people 
and people of color. Some justice advocates suggest that defendants and defenders 
“crash the system”—that is, collectively monkeywrench the machinery by refusing 
plea offers and insisting on taking cases to trial.430 Other scholars have noted the 
work of organizations such as All of Us or None and Families Against Mandatory 
Minimums.431 But legal scholars have yet to assess the democracy-enhancing 
potential, strategies, or influence of other solo and small-organization efforts such 
as Silicon Valley Debug, which trains families and communities in strategies to 
improve case outcomes.432 Innovative peace-making movements such as 
CeaseFire433 and the Violence Interrupters also hold promise for scholarly 
investigation,434 as does the grassroots activism of exonerated prisoners like John 
Thompson. 
Interdisciplinary action research opportunities also can focus on democracy 
enhancement through leadership development.435 Readily available avenues 
include court-watch and data-collection programs. In the specific context of 
indigent defense reform, Know Your Rights cards and consumer satisfaction 
surveys can develop experienced consumer-activist leadership to help redress the 
“Public Pretender” conundrum that besets service providers. In the same vein, 
community-based mediation diversion alternatives empower individuals and 
neighborhoods with problem-solving and violence-prevention strategies. 
Through these and other practical applications, scholars and practitioners can 
concretize a democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law and procedure that 
empowers the low-income and minority individuals who are most directly and 
disproportionately affected by the causes and consequences of crime to ask their 
own policy questions, build their own coalitions, and advocate for their own 
430 Alexander, supra note 82. 
431 Marsha Weissman, Aspiring to the Impracticable: Alternatives to Incarceration in 
the Era of Mass Incarceration, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 235, 267–68 (2009) 
(citing examples of grassroots organizations and coalitions). 
432 See, e.g., Falsely Arrested for Murder: How a Family Proved the Innocence, and 
Won the Release of a Young Father Facing Life, in SILICON VALLEY DE-BUG, COURT 
WARRIORS: A GUIDE FOR FAMILIES, COMMUNITIES, AND ORGANIZATIONS TO INFLUENCE 
THE CRIMINAL COURT SYSTEM 11, 11–12 (2011), available at http://issuu.com/svdebug/doc 
s/courtwarriors. 
433 See generally WESLEY G. SKOGAN ET. AL., EVALUATION OF CEASEFIRE-CHICAGO 
(2009), available at http://www.skogan.org/files/Evaluation_of_CeaseFire-Chicago_Main_ 
Report.03-2009.pdf (evaluating the im-pacts of CeaseFire-Chicago, a violence intervention 
program). 
434 See generally THE INTERRUPTERS (Kartemquin Films 2011).  
435 Cf. Anthony V. Alfieri, Post-racialism in the Inner City: Structure and Culture in 
Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 921, 962–63 (2010) (describing participatory community research 
aimed at diverting African American youth from the school-to-prison pipeline). 
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solutions. These are the crucial voices without which meaningful and sustainable 
criminal justice reform will remain elusive. They are the source of dangerous 
hope—dangerous because it is more often than not likely to be disappointed,436 and 
because when linked with vision, opportunism, and tenacity, it can at least 
occasionally level power disparities instead of ameliorating, reproducing, or 
augmenting them. 
436 Cf. Bell, supra note 40, at 252−53. 
 
                                                     
